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The present study was designed to provide empirical tests of some of the mechanisms 
thought to operate in mindfulness-based treatments. Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that 
appraising distress judgmentally (as a needless and useless indication of personal weakness) 
would be associated with experiencing meta-distress (e.g., feeling ashamed about being 
distressed), which would, in turn, be associated with increased experiential avoidance (i.e., 
suppression or distraction from the distress) and shorter distress tolerance. In addition, I 
examined the hypothesis that compassionately appraising distress (as normal, understandable, 
and potentially a source of growth) would be associated with spending more time curiously 
exploring that distress and thereby be associated with being able to tolerate distress for longer 
periods of time. Finally, I examined the prediction that compassionately appraising distress 
would be associated with even greater curious exploration and distress tolerance than viewing 
distress from a distanced perspective (as a passing mental event), which is often taught along 
side or as a prerequisite for compassionate appraisal.  One-hundred-sixty-seven psychologically 
healthy college students and members of the academic community at a large Mid Southern 
University underwent a series of distress inductions and were told to either simply monitor their 
level of distress (Awareness), judgmentally appraise distress (Judgment), maintain a distanced 
perspective from distress (Distancing), or compassionately appraise distress while also 
maintaining a distanced perspective (Compassion). As expected, some support was found for the 
hypothesis that compassionately appraising distress was associated with greater curious 
investigation of distress, if not longer distress tolerance. Moreover, compassionately appraising 
distress was associated with greater curious investigation than simply viewing distress from a 
distanced perspective, but only for the idiographic sadness induction. Hypotheses regarding the 
 
 
impact of judgmental appraisal could not be fairly evaluated in the present study, as it appeared 
that the judgment manipulation failed to sufficiently alter behavior. 
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I Judge, Therefore I React: 
An Experimental Investigation of Acceptance 
 Over the past two decades, interest in acceptance-based or “third wave” therapies has 
exploded. Indeed, randomized controlled trials now support the efficacy of flagship acceptance-
based treatments, such as Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction (Kabat-Zinn, 1990), Mindfulness-
Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999; 2012), Acceptance-Based 
Behavior Therapy for Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Roemer & Orsillo, 2005), and Dialectical 
Behavior Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993). In fact, these treatments appear to be more effective 
than either waitlist conditions or other active treatments for a variety of pathologies (Hofmann, 
Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010). Such evidence presently exists for depression and depressive relapse 
(Bondolfi et al., 2010; Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010; Teasdale. Segal, Williams, 
Ridgeway, Soulsby, & Lau, 2000), generalized anxiety disorder (Hayes-Skelton, Roemer, & 
Orsillo, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2010), and social anxiety disorder (Jazaieri, Goldin, Werner, Ziv, 
& Gross, 2012, Koszycki, Benger, Shlik, & Bradwejn, 2007), to name a few conditions. Among 
the largest bodies of such research belongs to investigations of DBT. DBT appears superior to 
waitlist and some other treatments for Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) or features of BPD 
(Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Harrned, Chapman, Dexter-Mazza, Murray, Comtois, & Linehan, 
2009; Linehan et al., 2006; Pistorello, Fruzzetti, MacLane, Gallop, & Iverson, 2012; van den 
Bosch, Koeter, Stijnen, Verheul, & van den Brink, 2005; Verheul, van den Bosch, Koeter, 
Ridder, Stijnen, & van den Brink, 2003), substance use in individuals with BPD (Linehan 
Schmidt, Dimeff, Craft, Kanter, & Comtois, 1999; Linehan et al, 2002), and disordered eating 




While such evidence is encouraging and may ultimately result in these treatments being 
designated empirically supported for these conditions (Chambless & Ollendick., 2001), treatment 
outcome studies also have considerable limitations. 
 For example, authors of varying theoretical persuasions have argued that an exclusive 
focus on treatment package efficacy research results in the propagation of “technologies of 
change,” rather than advancing scientific understanding of human function and dysfunction and 
informing “principles of change” that may then be included in multiple therapies (Hayes, Levin, 
Plumb-Vilardaga, Villatte, & Pistorello, 2013, Rosen & Davison, 2003). Furthermore, some have 
recently argued that evidence from randomized controlled trials ought to be augmented or even 
based on experimental demonstrations of the mechanisms of change posited to underlie the 
treatment under investigation (David & Montgomery, 2011; Lohr, 2011). Absent this latter form 
of evidence, both David and Montgomery (2011) and Lohr (2011) argue that the number of 
available treatments will continue to grow with no discernible end point, efforts to refine 
treatments will be slow, and fundamental questions about how people change in therapy will not 
be addressed. These authors argue that theories of change within therapies should be based on 
theories of how pathology develops or is maintained. Therefore, researchers interested in 
furthering the status of acceptance-based therapies are charged with evaluating and enhancing 
the current evidence base for the putative mechanisms of change in these therapies. 
 Although acceptance has long been considered a central mechanism of effortful change in 
several third-wave therapies (e.g., Baer, 2003; Bishop et al., 2004; Chadwick, Hember, Symes, 
Peters, Kuijpers, & Dagan, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Linehan, 1993; Marlatt 
& Kristeller, 1999), until recently, there was no definition of acceptance (Block-Lerner. Wulfert, 




2009; Karekla, Forsyth, & Kelly, 2004). The field was also lacking a clearly articulated working 
model of how lack of acceptance might lead to pathology by affecting thoughts, feelings, and 
actions and how acceptance might work to alter these things to promote healthy and effective 
functioning (Baer, 2003; Baer et al., 2004; Coffey at al., 2010; Dimidjian & Linehan, 2003; 
Marlatt & Kristeller, 1999). Absent a definition of or model for acceptance, researchers had 
difficulties finding evidence for the posited mechanisms of change in acceptance-based 
therapies, leaving those therapies vulnerable to accusations of pseudo-scientific bases (David & 
Montgomery, 2011; Lohr, 2011). Recognizing the need for both a definition and a working 
model of acceptance, Shaver and Veilleux (under review) have recently striven to fill these gaps. 
Two Dimensions of Acceptance 
 After a thorough examination of existing literature and source books for mindfulness and 
acceptance-based treatments, Shaver and Veilleux (under review) have discerned that the term 
“acceptance of negative emotions” has been used to refer to at least two inter-related dimensions 
of conscious and effortful behavior:  the appraisal dimension and the reaction dimension. The 
authors also identify two extremes of either of these dimensions, which roughly correspond to 
mechanisms for either pathology (which may involve automatic of overlearned processes) or 
healthy and effective emotional functioning (which generally entails conscious goal-directed 
efforts).  In regards to the appraisal dimension, the authors identify either conscious or automatic 
judgmental appraisals of emotional distress (i.e., as baseless, useless responses that reflect a 
personal deficit in the person having the reaction) as a pathology-generating mechanism, and link 
conscious and effortful compassionate appraisals of emotional distress (i.e., as natural, 
appropriate reactions that provide useful information about the environment, and/or one’s needs, 




regards to the reaction dimension, the authors identify experientially avoidant reactions to 
emotional distress (e.g., suppressing emotions, avoiding stimuli associated with emotion, and 
dampening emotion through other means) as being linked to pathology. On the other hand, the 
authors summarize several works that theoretically link  either willingly tolerating emotional 
distress (i.e., choosing to pursue goals, even when distress is involved, with no focus on altering 
that distress) or curiously exploring emotional distress (i.e., sitting with emotions in order to 
understand what information they might provide and how to best regulate or express them) with 
more effective and healthy behavior, such as continued goal pursuit in the face of distress and 
effective coping with that distress (e.g., Farmer & Chapman, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999; 2012; 
Leahy, Tirch, & Napolitano, 2011; Linehan, 1993).  
While some (e.g. Greenberg, 2002; Linehan, 1993, McKay, Wood, & Brantley, 2007), 
but not all (Hayes et al., 1999; 2012; Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Roemer & Orsillo, 2005; Segal et al., 
2003) third-wave therapies directly encourage pursuit the ideal poles identified by Shaver and 
Veilleux, theories underlying acceptance-based treatments uniformly suggest gains are partly due 
to moving clients from the pathology-generating end toward the healthy and effective end of 
both the appraisal and reaction dimensions (Greenberg, 2002; Hayes et al., 1999; 2012; Kabat-
Zinn,. 1990; Linehan, 1993, McKay, et al., 2007; Roemer & Orsillo, 2005). Moreover, there is 
some evidence for these claims (see Berking, Neasciu, Comtois, & Linehan, 2009; Forman, 
Herberg, Moitra, Yeomans, & Geller, 2007; Tanay, Lotan, & Bernstein, 2012). As such, both 
dimensions represent important theoretical mechanisms of action for third-wave therapies. Ergo, 
evidence, particularly experimental evidence, for either or both would help augment the 




Reaction dimension. What Shaver and Veilleux (under review) identify as the reaction 
dimension of acceptance (i.e., the continuum from either engaging in experiential avoidance to 
curiously exploring emotional distress) has been relatively better explored in the literature. 
Models of acceptance suggest that, when contrasted with willing tolerance or curious exploration 
of emotional distress (henceforth referred to simply distress), experientially avoidant coping with 
distress may dampen immediate distress, while also forestalling the resolution of that distress 
(c.f., Hayes et al., 1999; 2012; Linehan, 1993). Simply, people who respond by avoiding the 
experience of the distress (i.e., employ experiential avoidance)  may not get less upset, but may 
also remain somewhat distressed longer than those who react with willing tolerance or by 
curiously investigating their distress. Therefore, by encouraging either willing tolerance or 
curious exploration of distress, third-wave therapies promote emotional recovery each time an 
emotion-evoking stimulus is encountered. Indeed, ample available experimental evidence 
supports this hypothesized mechanism of change in third-wave behavior therapies (Campbell-
Sills, Barlow, Brown, & Hoffmann, 2006b; Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish, 2009; Liverant, 
Brown, Barlow, & Roemer, 2008; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009; Tull, Jacupcak, & Roemer, 
2010).  
In addition, with repeated exposures to distress, either willingly tolerating or curiously 
exploring distress should function much like exposure and lead to habituation. That is, if they 
repeatedly encounter situations that make them feel distressed, people who willingly tolerate or 
curiously investigate their distress may become less distressed by those situations across time 
(c.f., Quirk, Garcia, & Gonzalez-Lima, 2006; Quirk, 2007; Shaver & Veilleux, under review; 
Tull et al., 2010). There is presently a paucity of research on this topic. Moreover, with repeated 




exploring distress may reduce other types of appraisals of distress, like beliefs that distress may 
be physically dangerous or result in social ostracism (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 2007; 
Williams, Chambless, & Ahrens, 1997). Indeed, there is both evidence that individuals who are 
more often willing to tolerate distress are less afraid of emotions (Forsyth, Parker, & Finlay, 
2003; McKee, Zvolensky, Solomon, Bernsetein, & Leen-Feldner, 2007; Vujanovic, Bonn-Miller, 
Bernstein, McKee, & Zvolensky, 2010) and some evidence that treatments that aim to increase 
willing tolerance of distress also decrease fear of emotions (Arch, Wolitzky-Taylor, Eifert, & 
Craske, 2012; Keng, Smoski, Robins, Ekblad, & Brantley, 2012; Treanor, Erisman, Saulters-
Pedneault, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2011). There is presently no strong causal evidence for these 
mechanisms of change, however.  
Finally, if practiced habitually, curious exploration should increase self-understanding 
and emotional intelligence (Greenberg & Elliot, 2002; Hayes et al., 2012; Leahy et al., 2011; 
Linehan, 1993). While there is some cross-sectional evidence that individuals who are more 
often willing to tolerate distress are also more emotionally intelligent (e.g., Baer, Smith, & Allen, 
2004; Baer et al., 2006; Donaldson-Fielder & Bond, 2004), there is no experimental evidence 
documenting the long-term benefits of willingness in regards to increasing emotional 
intelligence. Experimental support for the link between willing tolerance, curious exploration, 
habituation of stimulus-driven fear, reductions of fear of emotions, and increasing emotional 
intelligence might be difficult to achieve. Because these effects of willing tolerance/ curious 
exploration are posited to occur with repeated applications of willing tolerance or curious 
exploration, tests of these effects would necessarily involve either multiple sessions or 




measures designs that may threaten internal validity, such as demand characteristics and attrition 
(Stratford, Mulligan, Downey, & Voss, 1999). 
Appraisal dimension. The appraisal dimension in Shaver and Veilleux’s (under review) 
model (i.e., the continuum between judgmentally appraising and compassionately appraising 
distress) has been considerably less well explored than the reaction dimension. The extant 
literature contains three main predictions regarding the impact of appraising emotions 
judgmentally, each of which currently lacks experimental support. Firstly, theory would suggest 
that judgmental appraisals should be linked to experiencing negative meta-emotions (emotions 
about emotions; Gottman, Katz, & Hooven, 1997; Mitmansgruber, Beck, Höfer, & Schüßler, 
2009), such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, or self-directed anger about being distressed (e.g., 
Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Linehan, 1993; Leahy et al., 2011). Indeed, cross-sectional evidence 
does suggest that individuals who often judgmentally appraise their distress experience more 
negative meta-emotions than those who less often appraise their distress this way (Baer, Smith, 
Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010; Vujanovic, et al., 
2010). In addition, this link is indirectly supported by some treatment research that suggests that 
individuals treated with at least one mindfulness-based therapy seem to experience reduced 
negative meta-emotions as a result (Gratz & Gunderson, 2006; Gratz & Tull, 2011). However, 
though amenable to single-session experimental designs, studies that have arguably manipulated 
appraisals of emotion have not measured meta-emotions (Atkinson & Wade, 2012; Dunn et al., 
2009; Low, Stanton, & Bower, 2008; Singer & Dobson, 2007; Szasz, Szentogotai, & Hofmann, 
2011; 2012). Thus, there is presently no experimental evidence of this mechanism of change. 




 Secondly, judgmental appraisals should be directly associated with experientially 
avoidant reactions towards distress, like suppression of subjective distress, distraction, or 
dampening of emotional responding through drinking or drug use (Hayes et al., 1999; Leahy et 
al., 2011; Linehan, 1993; Shaver & Veilleux, under review). Indeed, judgmental appraisals have 
been cross-sectionally positively linked to suppression of subjective distress (Campbell-Sills et 
al., 2006a), as well as other forms of experiential avoidance (Hayes et al., 2004), such as thought 
suppression, trauma-related avoidance, and drinking to cope (Baer et al., 2004; Baer et al., 2006; 
Hollis-Walker & Colosimo, 2011; Thompson & Waltz, 2010; Vujanovic, Bonn-Miller, & 
Marlatt., 2011; Vujanovic, Youngswirth, Johnson, & Zvolensky, 2009). This effect should be 
demonstrable in a single session, thus making this mechanism highly amenable to experimental 
psychopathological examination (Shaver & Veilleux, under review). Unfortunately, studies that 
have manipulated appraisals of emotion have generally also manipulated reactions towards 
emotions, precluding tests of this hypothesis (Atkinson & Wade, 2012; Campbell-Sills et al., 
2006b; Dunn et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2009; Liverant et al., 2008; Low et al., 2008; Singer & 
Dobson, 2007; Szasz et al., 2011; 2012; Tull et al., 2010). See Appendix A for specific 
examples. Due to this limitation, there is presently no experimental support for the idea that 
judgmental appraisals of emotion lead to experientially avoidant reactions towards emotion.  
Finally, expert opinion suggests that judgmental appraisals of distress may indirectly 
increase experientially avoidant responses towards distress via increasing negative meta-
emotions (e.g., Leahy et al., 2011; Linehan, 1993). Though there is some cross-sectional 
evidence that individuals who experience more negative meta-emotions also tend to engage in 
more frequent experiential avoidance (Coffey et al., 2010; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Tull, Rodman, 




experientially avoidant reactions has not been explored in the cross-sectional literature. 
Furthermore, because experimental studies to date of either appraisals of emotions or reactions 
towards emotions have not assessed meta-emotions (Atkinson & Wade, 2012; Dunn et al., 2009; 
Low et al., 2008; Singer & Dobson, 2007; Szasz et al., 2011; 2012), there is no experimental 
support that judgmental appraisals of emotion directly or indirectly increase experiential 
avoidance. 
In addition to describing the effects of the pathological side of the appraisal continuum 
(i.e., judgmental appraisal), Shaver and Veilleux (under review) also enumerate potential 
positive consequences of the more adaptive end of the appraisal continuum- compassionate 
appraisals of distress. Indeed, therapies that provide a focus on this type of acceptance, such as 
DBT (Linehan, 1993) and Emotion Schema Therapy (Leahy et al., 2011) seem to reduce 
judgmental appraisals of distress (Forman et al., 2007). Moreover, these treatments focus on 
teaching clients to appraise their distress compassionately. As Shaver and Veilleux (under 
review) deduced by reviewing several treatment manuals, the compassionate way to evaluate 
emotions is to see them as natural, appropriate reactions that provide useful information about 
the environment, and/or one’s needs, and are sources of potential personal strength (c.f. Craske 
& Barlow, 2006; Greenberg & Elliot, 2002; Hope, Heimberg, & Turk, 2010;; Leahy et al., 2011; 
Linehan, 1993; Resick, Monson, & Chard., 2007; Roemer & Orsillo, 2009; Shapiro, Carlson, 
Astin, & Freedman., 2006). These compassionate appraisals of emotion are thought to be 
associated with effective emotion regulation specifically because they are thought to be 
associated with curious exploration of distress (Hayes et al., 1999; Leahy et al., 2011; Linehan, 
1993). That is, whereas judgmental appraisals of emotion distress are thought to lead to 




are expected to lead to more curious welcoming exploration of distress, such as exploring 
distress to understand which negative emotion one is feeling, why one is feeling that way, and 
whether this feeling might best direct further action or be regulated in order to facilitate 
continued effective action (e.g., Linehan, 1993; McKay et al., 2007). These compassionate 
appraisals have not been explored in the literature. Moreover, as mentioned above, no study has 
striven to manipulate judgmental appraisals of emotion without also instructing participants to 
employ either experiential avoidant or curios and welcoming exploration of distress. Therefore, 
there is presently a paucity of experimental evidence for judging emotions as a potential 
mechanism of change within third-wave therapies. 
Disentangling Acceptance and Distancing  
 Shaver and Veilleux (under review) highlight one further gap in the existing experimental 
literature that deserves mention. Specifically, the authors highlight the need to consider whether 
viewing emotions from a distanced perspective (i.e., watching one’s emotions as if they were on 
a movie screen, with an appreciation that they change from moment to moment and need not 
direct behavior) might have effects similar to those of either form of acceptance. Indeed, 
distancing is considered a pre-requisite for either dimension of acceptance (c.f., Baer, 2003, 
Bishop et al., 2004; Kabat-Zinn, 1990) and has also been associated with mental health gains 
similar to those posited to result from acceptance. In particular, adopting an observing/ distanced 
perspective towards one’s thoughts and emotions is a putative mechanism of change in 
cognitive-behavior therapies and third wave therapies (e.g., Hayes et al., 1999; 2012; Mennin, 
Ellard, Fresco, & Gross, 2013; Segal et al., 2003) and has been empirically linked to mood 
recovery (Levin, Hildebrandt, Lillis, & Hayes, 2012; Ortner & Zelazo, 2012; Pilecki & Deacon, 




therapy (Arch, et al., 2012; Carmody, Baer, Lykins, & Olendzki, 2009; Forman, Chapman, 
Herbert, Goetter, Yuen, & Moitra, 2012; Hayes-Skelton, Usmani, Lee, Roemer, & Orsillo, 2012; 
Lau et al., 2006; Teasdale, Moore, Hayhurst, Pope, Williams, & Segal, 2002).  
Therefore, Shaver and Veilleux (under review) argue that researchers interested in 
demonstrating the effects of the appraisal and reaction dimensions of acceptance should strive to 
demonstrate its incremental effects over those of distancing by including a distancing-only 
condition. Without such a condition, important questions about the chance processes in third 
wave therapies would remain (David & Montgomery, 2011; Lohr, 2011). Several studies that 
have assessed the impact of compassionate appraisals of distress and/or willingness and curious 
exploration on distress have failed to include clear distancing instructions in these conditions 
(Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b; Hofmann et al., 2009; Liverant et al., 2008; Szasz et al., 2011; Tull 
et al., 2010), and those that have done so have not included distancing-only conditions for 
comparison (Atkinson & Wade, 2012; Dunn et al., 2009; Low et al., 2008; Singer & Dobson, 
2007; Szasz et al., 2012). See Appendix A for details. Therefore, the questions of whether either 
dimension of acceptance produces incremental gains over those attributable to adopting a 
distanced perspective towards distress remains open. 
The Present Study 
 The present study was designed to address the most sizable gaps in the current body of 
experimental literature on the effects of acceptance. I provided a test of whether judgmentally 
appraising distress can lead to experiential avoidance of distress, while judging emotions 
compassionately may lead to curious and welcoming reactions towards negative emotions. 
Further, I examined whether judgmentally appraising distress appears to lead to greater negative 




mechanism. Moreover, I tested whether adopting a distanced perspective towards distress 
produces results similar to those of compassionate acceptance in that distancing with or without 
compassionate appraisal is associated with less experiential avoidance and more curious 
exploration than a non-distanced control condition. Finally, I examined the incremental benefits 
of compassionate appraisals of emotion in terms of whether adopting these appraisals reduces 
experiential avoidance and increases curious exploration above the effects of adopting a 
distancing perspective.  
Specific Hypotheses  
 I examined 5 inter-related hypotheses: 
1. Appraising distress judgmentally would lead to greater experiential avoidance, in part 
by leading to greater meta-distress. Thus: 
a. People coached to judgmentally appraise their distress would react with 
greater experiential avoidance than other conditions. 
b. People coached to judgmentally appraise their distress would experience 
greater meta-distress than the other conditions. 
2. Viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective reduced experiential 
avoidance by reducing meta-distress. Thus: 
a. People who were given the instruction to view distress from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., those in either the Distancing or the Compassion conditions) 
would endorse less experiential avoidance than those in the Awareness 




b. People who were given the instruction to view distress from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., those in either the Distancing or the Compassion conditions) 
would endorse lower meta-distress than those in the control condition. 
3. Adopting a distanced perspective from distress increases distress tolerance by 
increasing curious exploration of distress. 
a. People coached to adopt a distanced perspective from their distress (i.e., those 
in the Distancing and Compassion conditions) would evidence greater distress 
tolerance than those in the other two conditions. 
b. People coached to adopt a distanced perspective from distress (i.e., those in 
the Distancing and Compassion conditions) would endorse more curious 
exploration of their distress than the other two conditions. 
4. Compassionately appraising distress increases distress tolerance by increasing curious 
exploration beyond the effect of defusing from distress. 
a. People in the Compassion condition would tolerate distress for a longer period 
of time than those in the Distancing condition. 
b. People in the Compassion condition would endorse more curious exploration 
of their distress than those in the Distancing condition. 
5. Beyond condition differences in outcomes, path models will support the indirect 
effects of judgment on experiential avoidance (via meta-distress) and the indirect 










All participants were recruited from a larger pool of people who had expressed the desire 
to be involved in one or more of the many studies that were ongoing between Spring 2014 and 
Spring 2015 in a research laboratory at a large public Mid-Southern University. Introductory 
psychology students were recruited for the initial screener using Experimetrix and all other 
students and community members were recruited for the initial screener via advertisements in the 
university paper and on Craigslist. The initial screener was administered by Qualtrics and 
included measures of current mood, psychiatric symptoms, and medication use, along with 
lifetime history of diagnosis with mood, anxiety, substance use, or personality pathology.  To 
qualify for the present study, participants denied ever having been diagnosed with a mood 
disorder, indicated they had not started anti-depressants or mood stabilizers in the past six 
months, and denied current or lifetime history of receiving a diagnosis borderline personality 
disorder. Moreover, to qualify, participants were required to endorse insufficient current 
depressive symptoms to suggest they might actively be experiencing a major depressive episode. 
Finally,  to qualify, participants were required to endorse fewer than 7 symptoms of borderline 
personality disorder on the McLean Screening Inventory for Borderline Personality Disorder 
(MSI-BPD: Zanarini, Vujanovic, Parachini, Boulanger, Frankenburg, & Henson, 2003).   
Of the 2,115 people who completed the Qualtrics screener, 1,593 (75%) were qualified 
for the present study. The largest number of people disqualified (N = 266, 12%) were 
disqualified because their responses indicated they might be experiencing a major depressive 




altering medications in the last six months (suggestive of potential mood diagnosis; N = 259, 
12%). A total of 227 (11%) interested participants were disqualified because they endorsed 7 or 
more items on the MSI-MPD, and 102 (5%) were disqualified because they reported having 
previously been diagnosed with a mood disorder or BPD. Offers for participation were made 
either via email or with a telephone call, contingent upon the availability of funding and other 
methods of compensation (i.e., research credits) on a first-come first-served basis to subjects 
from this pool. Qualified participants were contacted either via email or over the phone and were 
directly scheduled for a two-hour slot to the laboratory and complete the rest of the study. 
The final recruited pool of participants consisted of 86 introductory psychology students 
(Mage = 20.36, SD = 4.21, range = 18- 25, 59.3% Women, 73% White, 10.5% Hispanic, 7% 
Black, 3.5% Asian American, 3.5% Native American, and 2.3% Other) and 80 university 
students with other majors or other members of the University community (Mage = 20.22, SD = 
2.67, range = 18 – 37, 63.6% Women, 60.5% White, 14.5% Black, 9.2% Hispanic, 2.6% Asian 
American, 1.3% Native American, 11.7% Other). There were no significant differences between 
introductory psychology students and other students or community members in terms of gender 
(!2 [1, N = 164] = 0.77, p = .39), ethnicity, (!2 [7, N = 164] = 9.77, p = .22 or age, t (164) = 0.22, 
p = .22. Introductory psychology students were compensated with research credits and all others 
were paid $15 for their participation.  Four of these participants experienced technological 
difficulties (i.e., data loss due to computer malfunction) and their data is not reported here. 
Materials  
Measures. 
Affect Control Scales (ACS; Williams et al., 1997). Because there is some evidence that 




their emotions (Singer & Dobson, 2009), all qualified participants’ fears of emotions were 
measured using the ACS (Williams et al., 1997). The ACS is a 42-item self-report measure of 
fears related to experiencing anger, anxiety, depression, and positive emotions. Participants 
responded to items on a scale of 1 (Very Strongly Disagree) to 7 (Very Strongly Agree), where 7 
indicates a strong fear of the named emotion. A total score was derived using the average of all 
items. Example items include: “There is nothing I can do to stop anxiety once it has started” and 
“I am afraid that letting myself feel really angry about something could lead me into an unending 
rage.” The ACS has demonstrated acceptable internal consistency across multiple samples ("s 
from .94 to .95; Stapinski, Abbott, & Rapee, 2010; Williams et al., 1997) and has also 
demonstrated adequate test-retest reliability ("= .78) and convergent validity with similar 
measures (Williams et al., 1997).  The ACS had a mean of 2.86 (SD = .79, range = 1.28 – 4.74) 
and demonstrated excellent internal consistency (" = .94) in the present sample. 
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The DERS 
was completed by all participants in order to control for the group-level individual differences in 
the tendency to experience shame, guilt, embarrassment, or self-directed anger when upset. The 
DERS is a 36-item measure that assesses 6 types of abilities thought to underlie effective 
emotion regulation: Awareness of Emotions (Awareness), the ability to label one’s feeling states 
(Clarity), the ability not to feel guilty, ashamed, embarrassed, and angry at oneself for feeling 
upset, the ability to control emotional impulses while emotional (Impulse), the ability to pursue 
valued goals while emotional (goals), and the belief in one’s ability to regulate emotions 
(Strategies). Participants were asked to respond on a scale from 1 (almost never) to 5 (almost 
always) how often each statement applies to them. The DERS subscales demonstrated good 




Roemer, 2008) The non-acceptance subscale, in particular, has shown good internal consistency 
in at least two other samples ("s = .90-.92; Gratz, Bornovalova, Delany-Brumsey, Nick, & 
Lejuez, 2007; Kashdan, Zvolensky, & McLeish, 2008) and has demonstrated adequate test-retest 
reliability (" = .69; Gratz & Roemer, 2004). The non-acceptance subscale of the DERS had a 
mean of 11.55 (SD = 4.78, range = 6 – 30) and showed good (" = .85) internal consistency in 
this sample. In addition to completing the published measure once at the start of the study, all 
participants completed modified version of the non-acceptance subscales of this measure after 
both the sad mood induction and the distressing images task that was revised specifically to 
assess meta-distress experienced during each task.  These revisions are contained in Appendix E 
and F. The version completed in the sad mood induction task (DERS-NA-SM) demonstrated 
excellent internal consistency (" = .90) and the version completed in the distressing images task 
(DERS-NA-DT) displayed good internal consistency (" = .80). 
Experiences Questionnaire (EQ; Fresco et al., 2007). In order to consider the possibility 
that group differences in reactions and meta-emotions might be due to group differences in trait 
distancing, all qualified participants were administered the EQ. The EQ is an 11-tem measure 
designed to assess trait differences in defusion/distancing Items are rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale from 1 (never) to 5 (all the time). The EQ has demonstrated adequate internal consistency 
in a college sample (" = .83) and excellent reliability in a clinical sample (" = .90; Fresco et al., 
2007).  In the present sample, the mean of the EQ was 31.10 (SD = 5.53, range = 20 – 52) and it 
displayed adequate internal consistency (" = .78). 
Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ; Baer et al., 2006). The FFMQ was 
administered to all qualified participants tin order o control for group-level differences in certain 




findings. The FFMQ is a 39-item questionnaire designed to measure five aspects off 
mindfulness: observing, describing, acting with awareness, non-judging of inner experience, and 
non-reactivity to inner experience. Responses are recorded on a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (never or very rarely true) to 5 (always or almost always true). All five facet scales 
showed adequate to good internal consistency during scale development: non-reactivity (FFMQ-
NR) = .75, observing= .83, acting with awareness = .87, describing = .91, and non-judging 
(FFMQ-NJ) = .87. In the present sample, the mean of the FFMQ-NJ subscale was 27.73 (SD = 
6.40, range = 10 – 40) and that subscale demonstrated good internal consistency (" = .87). 
Similarly, the mean of the FFMQ-NR was 22.58 (SD = 4.16, range = 12 – 35) and this subscale 
demonstrated adequate (" = .75) internal consistency in this sample.   
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire (REQ; Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a). The REQ is 
a measure designed to assess reacting either by employing experiential avoidance or acceptance 
towards one’s emotions during an induction. Participants completed two modified versions of the 
REQ-experiential avoidance subscale that will assess the level of experiential avoidance towards 
emotions (suppression, distraction, reframing to reduce emotional response, and redirecting 
attention) that they experience during both the sad mood induction (REQ-SM) and the 
distressing images task (REQ-DT), described below. Specifically, participants will all respond to 
four items that ask them to rate on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 8 (all the time) how often they 
responded to their emotions in each of the ways described above during each manipulation. 
These measures are in Appendix E and F. The REQ-SM demonstrated adequate internal 
consistency (" = .78), and the REQ-DT demonstrated good internal consistency (" = .81). 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale (TMS; Lau et al., 2006). The TMS is a 13-item scale that 




practice. Participants were asked to indicate on a scale from 0 (not at all) to 4 (very much) how 
well each of 13 statements applied to the way they reacted to their emotions during each of the 
affect inductions reviewed below. The TMS was chosen as a repeated assessment of curiosity 
and distancing because it was designed to use after mindfulness instructions and practice (Lau et 
al., 2006). The version completed by participants after the sad mood induction (TMS-C-SM) is 
contained in Appendix E, and the version completed after the distressing images task (TMS-C-
DT) is contained in Appendix F. The TMS-C-SM demonstrated excellent internal consistency (" 
= .90) and the TMS-C-DT demonstrated good internal consistency in this sample (" = .89). 
Visual Analogue Scale for distress (VAS). A VAS is a type of measure that has 
historically been used to assess the bipolar dimensions of emotional valence or emotional arousal 
on a scale ranging from 0 (positive/ calm) to 100 (negatives/ highly aroused). It has been used 
with the following anchors: relaxed–tense, calm–angry, unafraid–afraid, happy–sad, normal– 
unreal, relieved– uptight, contented–ashamed, and accepting–punishing. In the present study, 
participants were asked to rate the valence of their general and current emotional state on a 
computer, on a continuous line from 0 (positive) to 100 (negative; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009; 
Teasdale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980; Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2003). This measure will be 
administered as a trait measure once and as a state measure seven times. The trait measure asked 
participants to rate their general emotional state (i.e., how they tend to feel), whereas the state 
measures (Appendix B, C, E, and F) inquired about the participants’ current emotional state. 
Procedures 
Trait measures. Invited participants were brought in for an in-person session lasting 
approximately 2 hours. They began their session by completing a battery of trait measures, 




of four instruction conditions: control/Awareness, Distancing, Compassion, and Judgment using 
a random number table. Because research assistants were required to be prepared to answer 
condition-specific questions, they were not blind to participant condition. However, the majority 
of the protocol was standardized through scripting in order to minimize demand effects and any 
differences between research assistants.  
Psycho-education and initial assessment point. Participants in all conditions were then 
provided with psycho-education in video format. Each participant in every condition watched the 
same animated psycho-education video, in which the constructs of distress, mindful attention, 
distanced perspective, meta-distress, experiential avoidance, and curious exploration of distress 
were all explained using animated shorts and a voiceover. Exact psycho-educational text and 
specific text for the repeated assessments are in Appendix B. The following assessments were 
administered after the associated psycho-educational clip, in the order presented: 
Initial assessment of momentary distress. Participants were asked to complete the VAS. 
Initial assessment of mindful attention. Each participant was asked to rate from 0 (not at 
all) to 8 (all the time) how often they remained aware (i.e., intentionally focused on emotions 
and sensations and attempting to label noted sensations and emotions) since the experiment 
began (or, for further administrations, since the last assessment point). 
Initial assessment of distanced perspective. Each participant was asked to rate on a scale 
of 0 (not at all) to 8 (all the time) how often they intentionally viewed their emotions from a 
distanced perspective (i.e., as if they were on a movie screen) since the experiment began (or, for 
further administrations, since the last assessment point). 
Initial assessment of meta-distress. Each participant was asked to indicate on a scale of 0 




being distressed that they experienced since the experiment began (or, for further 
administrations, since the last assessment point). 
Initial assessment of experiential avoidance and curious exploration. Each participant 
was asked to respond to a single question that asked how often on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 8 
(all the time) they had responded to their emotions with experiential avoidance (i.e., by 
suppressing, distracting, reframing, or redirecting attention) or curious exploration (i.e., by 
sitting with and exploring their emotions to learn more about themselves) since the experiment 
began. 
Self-monitoring instructions. At the end of the psycho-education, all participants were 
given the following instructions: “As part of this experiment, you will do two tasks that can be 
upsetting to some people. As you go through these tasks, we would like you to pay attention to 
your level of distress.” 
Sad mood induction. After the psycho-education, all participants underwent a 5-minute 
negative mood induction consisting of listening to the first five minutes of the 1996 London 
Philharmonic’s recording of “Adagio in G Minor,” composed by Albinoni, replayed at half 
speed, combined with being prompted to recall three autobiographical events that made them feel 
lonely, rejected, defeated, or hurt. They will be instructed to remember everything that happened 
and how they felt, with each memory getting sadder and more unpleasant. This induction 
methodology has been used in previous studies (Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009), combines two 
effective methods for negative mood induction that, when used together, produce the largest 
effect size of any well-used induction methods (Westerman, Spies, Stahl, & Hesse, 1996). This 
induction method may be ideal for acceptance studies because it can be administered multiple 




induction measures were collected in order to allow everything that occurred between the initial 
induction and the end of the post-booster recovery period (discussed below) to serve as a 
continuous sad mood induction. 
Second administration of repeated measures. After undergoing the sad mood 
induction, participants completed a second repeated measurement of the VAS and measures of 
meta-distress, mindful attention, distanced perspective, experiential avoidance, and curios 
exploration of distress. The VAS was later used to determine the efficacy of the inductions for 
this study and the other measurement points were collected for future exploratory analyses. 
These measures are contained in Appendix D. 
Experimental instructions. After the sad mood induction, participants in each condition 
received the experimental instructions given below. The musical score continued to play at a 
lower volume during the instructions in order to allow the verbal instructions to be heard and to 
allow the participants to attend to the video. Because there is a difference in the length of the 
instructions, the point at which the instructions are read was varied so that the instructions for all 
conditions ended at the same point, approximately 2 minutes after the initial sad mood induction. 
Participants in the control condition received the monitoring instructions twice, in order that they 
might be mentally occupied to the same extent as other conditions.  
Control/ Awareness instructions. “Many people become upset during this task. Over the 
next few minutes, we would you to pay attention to your level of distress. Many people become 
upset during this task. Over the next few minutes, we would you to pay attention to your level of 
distress.” 
Judgment instructions. “Many people become upset during this task. Over the next few 




remind yourself that there is no reason to become upset during this task, as doing so will not be 
useful to you. We would also like you to remind yourself that if you are upset, that is only 
because you are not strong enough to stop yourself from becoming upset. For example, you 
could repeat to yourself periodically, ‘I don’t have to feel this way, it is not helping me, and I 
only feel this way because I am not strong enough to stop myself.’”  
Distancing instructions. “Many people become upset during this task. Over the next few 
minutes, we would you to pay attention to your level of distress. Over the next few minutes, we 
would you to pay attention to your level of distress. Now we would like you to try to view your 
distress from a distanced perspective. This means, as you focus on the way the music and 
memories make you feel, tell yourself ‘I am noticing that I am feeling distressed, and these 
feelings are only events happening in my mind at this moment.’ An additional tool for 
maintaining a distant perspective from emotions is visualizing emotions as images passing on a 
movie screen. So, if it works better for you, visualize your feelings and the sensations in your 
body as images on a screen, constantly changing and evolving from second to second.” 
 Compassion instructions. “Many people become upset during this task. Over the next 
few minutes, we would you to pay attention to your level of distress. Over the next few minutes, 
we would you to pay attention to your level of distress. Now we would like you to try to view 
your distress from a distanced perspective. This means, as you focus on the way the music and 
memories make you feel, tell yourself ‘I am noticing that I am feeling distressed, and these 
feelings are only events happening in my mind at this moment.’ An additional tool for 
maintaining a distant perspective from emotions is visualizing emotions as images passing on a 
movie screen. So, if it works better for you, visualize your feelings and the sensations in your 




 As you notice your emotions from a distanced perspective, we would like you to remind 
yourself that you are feeling distressed for a reasons, that your distress might provide you with 
useful information about yourself, and that being distressed in this way might actually make you 
stronger in the long run. For example, while holding a distanced perspective, you might repeat to 
yourself ‘I am feeling distressed for a reason, I might be able to learn about myself from this 
feeling, and I can grow stronger though feeling this way.’”  
 Comprehension check. Participants’ level of comprehension of experimental 
instructions was assessed after the instructional video using a self-report measure containing four 
items adapted from Campbell-Sills and colleagues (2006b). Table 2 shows questions asked, 
numbers of participants who provided the correct answers for each condition, and the numbers of 
participants who made errors of omission (selected No when the answer should have been Yes) 
or commission (selected Yes when the answer should have been No) for each item in each 
condition. Those participants who provided incorrect responses their comprehension check 
received a brief verbal instruction from a trained research assistant as to which instructions they 
were to follow. Control participants with errors of commission were told that they could respond 
to their emotions any way they wanted to and were not being asked to do any particular thing. 
Exact text is contained in Appendix C. Experimenters added a note to the participant’s file 
regarding whether correction was given, in order that it could be used as a covariate in the 
analyses. 
Cue cards. In order to continuously prompt participants in the use of the techniques 
covered in the instructional videos, experimenters provided cue cards to participants in all 
conditions after the comprehension check. For ease of reading, cue cards were generally placed 




participant’s given condition in bulleted format. Research assistants specifically reminded 
participants to use the technique described on the cue card by saying “As you go through this 
next task, please remember to respond to emotions that arise by [condition-specific method].” 
Sad mood booster session. After receiving cue cards, participants began a 3-minute sad 
mood booster session. Specifically, the musical score returned to full volume and they were 
asked to recall the event that made them feel the most lonely, rejected, defeated, or hurt. They 
were instructed to remember everything that happened and how they felt. Furthermore, they were 
asked to focus on the scenery when the event occurred, on any physical sensations they recalled 
having experienced, and on what they were thinking the event meant about them.  
Sad mood booster recovery period. After the 3-minute booster session, all participants 
were prompted to respond to any distress they felt over the subsequent few minutes using the 
methods detailed in the video and on the cue cards. They then entered a 5-minute recovery 
period in which they continued listening to the musical score and completed all repeated once 
every minute. These measures are contained in Appendix E. 
Post-recovery assessments for the sad mood induction. After the sad mood booster 
recovery period, all participants completed measures of experimental compliance. Consistent 
with prior research on acceptance (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b), participants across all 
groups rated their level of compliance with instructions and engagement in out-of-condition 
behaviors (i.e., engaging in behaviors in which they were not asked to engage) by rating how 
often from 0 (never) to 8 (always) they viewed their emotions from a distanced perspective, 
appraised their emotions judgmentally (e.g., “Reminded myself that I had no reason to feel 
distressed, it is a useless way to feel, and that the only reason I feel that way is because I have 




Reminded myself that I felt distressed for a reason, that I could use that feeling to better 
understand myself and my needs, and that allowing myself to feel that way might make me 
stronger.”) during the sad mood induction booster session and recovery period.  They also 
completed versions of the Non-Acceptance subscale of the DERS (i.e., DERS-NA-SM), the 
Experiential Avoidance subscale of the REQ (i.e., REQ-SM), and the Curiosity subscale of the 
TMS (i.e., TMS-C-SM) that referred to behaviors during the induction, booster, and recovery 
periods. These assessments are contained in Appendix E. Research assistants entered the room at 
this point in the protocol to verify that all measures were complete prior to moving to the next 
task.  
Distressing images task. Immediately after the sad mood induction booster recovery 
period, participants were oriented to the distressing images tasked and told that they were to 
press “q” when they first noticed themselves becoming distressed and “p” when that distress was 
intolerable and they wished to move to the next slide.  They were verbally reminded to use the 
technique provided on the cue card to respond to any distress that presented during the task. 
They then viewed 45 IAPS images that have been rated as negatively valenced and highly 
arousing (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) across 5 randomized blocks of 9 randomly placed 
images within each block. This task was recently developed in order to provide an objective 
measure of tolerance of distressing emotions aside from frustration (Veilleux, Pollert, Zielinski, 
& Shaver, 2013). I chose this secondary task in order to provide an objective measure of distress 
tolerance, and thereby assess experiential avoidance using multiple methods. Distress tolerance 
was operationalized as the difference between when a participant pressed the “q” key to express 
distress and when that same participant pressed the “p” key to terminate the slide and move to 




images task, VAS, meta-distress, experiential avoidance, and curious exploration were assessed 
after each of the randomly ordered groups of 9 slides.  These measures are in Appendix F. 
Compliance check and post-induction assessment for the distressing images task. 
After the distressing images task, all participants completed the same measures of experimental 
compliance again (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b), this time with a focus on their experiences in 
the distressing images task. Numbers of participants who responded correctly and committed 
errors or omission and commission are presented in Table 2. They also completed versions of the 
Non-Acceptance subscale of the DERS (i.e., DERS-NA-DT), the Experiential Avoidance 
subscale of the REQ (i.e., REQ-DT), and the Curiosity subscale of the TMS (i.e., TMC-C-DT) 
that had been reworded to refer to behaviors during the distressing images task. Text for these 
measures is in the Appendix F. 
Credibility and perceived utility checks. In order to examine reasons for compliance or 
non-compliance with experimental instructions, I assessed participants’ opinions about the 
credibility of the person in the instructional video and their initial beliefs about whether the 
method presented might be helpful (Singer & Dobson, 2007). To accomplish the former, all 
participants indicated on a 7-point Likert scale the extent to which they found the instructor 
credible/knowledgeable from 1 (not at all) to 7 (extremely). To accomplish the latter, participants 
in all conditions were asked how useful they believe the approach presented would be from 1 
(not at all) to 7 (extremely). Exact text is contained in Appendix C.  
Positive mood induction. Following the distressing images task, the research assistant 
reentered the room, assessed the participant’s level of distress, and offered the participants the 
chance to watch between 1 and 3 amusing video clips that evidence suggests would raise their 




videos, the research assistant again checked on the participant’s mood and offered the chance to 
repeat them. Specific videos are listed below: 
On Golden Pond (Universal Pictures, 1981). In this 32 second clip, Ethel is shown on 
holiday and walks through the wood. There, she meets her daughter Chelsea. This movie has 
been shown to induce amusement (Tomarken, Davidson, & Henriques, 1990).  
An Officer and a Gentleman (Lorimar Film Entertainment, 1982). In this 111s clip, 
Paula, a factory worker, is carried out of her work by Zack, a young marine. This clip has been 
shown to induce amusement (Tomarken et al., 1990).  
When Harry Met Sally (New Line Cinema, 1989). In this 149s clip. Harry and Sally 
discuss about whether Harry would notice it if a woman could fake an orgasm. This film has 
been shown to induce amusement (Gross & Levenson, 1995). 
Debriefing and compensation. Once they were no longer distressed about the 
experiment, participants were then debriefed and compensated. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
Missing data imputation. In order to maximize power, missing values on the trait 
measures were imputed. Less than 5% of responses were missing on any of the covariates, with 
the exception of a single item on the Affect Control Scales. Approximately 8% of respondents (N 
= 13) chose not to answer this question, which read “Having an orgasm is scary for me because I 
am afraid of losing control.” Tests for randomness in missing values on the ACS suggested they 
were missing completely at random, Little’s MCAR !2 (202, 163) = 229.09, p = .09. As such, 




Pre-manipulation group differences in confounding traits. To protect against the 
possibility that any condition-level differences in outcomes could result from failures in 
randomization, condition-level differences in possible confounding demographics (i.e., gender), 
and trait measures of judgmental appraisals (FFMQ-NJ), experiential avoidance (FFMQ-NR), 
fear of emotions (ACQ-Total), meta-distress (DERS-NonAccept), distancing (EQ-Total), distress 
(the trait VAS), and pre-manipulation state measures of distress, meta-distress, experiential 
avoidance, and curious investigation were examined using ANOVAs. In order not to allow the 
fact that some of these variables may actually impact likelihood of compliance or response to the 
manipulation (e.g., Singer & Dobson, 2009) to confound the results, I conducted these ANOVAs 
prior to limiting the sample to only those who had complied with instructions at least half the 
time. No condition differences were found in gender (!2 [3, N = 163] = 4.52, p = .21). Similarly, 
there were no significant condition differences in trait judgmental appraisals (FFMQ-NJ; F[3, 
162] = 0.66, p = .58), meta-distress (DERS-NonAccept; F[3, 163] = 1.37, p = .25), distancing 
(EQ-Total; F[3, 163] = 0.09, p = .96), experiential avoidance (FFMQ-NR; F[3, 162] = 0.25,  p = 
.86), or fear of distressing emotions (ACQ-Total), F(3, 163) = 0.92, p = .43. Hence, it would 
seem unlikely that any of the hypothesis-driven analyses are due to failures in randomization and 
no covariates were included in the hypothesis-driven analyses. 
Examining comprehension. Although comprehension errors were corrected by trained 
research assistants using a script and, thus, were not considered potential confounds in this study, 
I examined rates or errors across and between each group for the purposes of improving future 
study methodology. Table 2 presents data on the number of participants who made no errors, 




endorsed) and commission (endorsing an item that should not have been endorsed) for the total 
sample along with each of the four conditions. 
. The average participant in this study made less than 1 error on the comprehension check 
(Merror = 0.71, SD = .85, range = 0 – 4). Of the 164 participants who whose data could be used 
for further analyses, approximately half (N = 80, 48%) made no errors on the comprehension 
check. Approximately one-third (N = 54, 33%) of participants made one error on the 
comprehension check, and the remaining one-fifth of participants (N = 30, 19%) made 2 or more 
errors on the comprehension check. Relatively few participants across conditions committed 
errors of omission (i.e., failing to endorse an item that one is intended to endorse). Instead most 
common type of error across conditions was errors of commission (i.e., endorsing an item one is 
not intended to endorse). In particular, almost half of the participants in the Awareness/Control 
and Judgment conditions incorrectly reported they had been asked to view distress from a 
distanced perspective and between a fourth and a fifth of participants in these conditions also 
reported being asked to judge distress compassionately. By contrast, few participants in any 
condition incorrectly expressed the belief they were being asked to judgmentally appraise 
distress. 
Moreover, overall, there were moderate magnitude between-group differences in total 
number of errors, F (3, 161) = 10.03, p < .001, !p2 = .16. Surprisingly, follow-up Tukey tests 
suggested that people in the Awareness condition made significantly more errors than any other 
condition. Participants in the Judgment condition made significantly more errors than people in 
the Compassion condition, #M = 0.47, p = .04. There were no other significant between-
condition differences. Because these errors were corrected in the course of the study by trained 




Identifying successful inductions.  
Sad mood induction. Overall rate of induction success and condition-dependent 
differences in that success rate were explored using chi-squared tests. I originally intended to 
follow precedent (e.g., Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Singer & Dobson, 2007:2009) and require a 
20-pooint VAS shift from pre-induction to post-induction to consider either the sad mood or the 
distressing images induction successful. Using this criterion, only 53% (N = 88) of the 
participants were successfully induced through the sad mood task and there were no condition 
differences, !2 (3, N = 164) = 5.90, p = .12. These rates are significantly lower than those 
reported in other studies using similar induction methods with either the same (Singer & Dobson, 
2007; Singer & Dobson, 2009) or different methods of assessing successful induction (Clark & 
Teasdale, 1985; Martin, 1990). Although it would have been possible to simply eliminate the 
induction success criterion, I chose not to do so on the grounds that the experimental instructions 
specifically instructed participants to apply the techniques to distressing emotional reactions to 
the induction. As such, it seemed important to only include participants who had had some 
measurable decrement in mood during the induction. To accomplish this goal, I chose to use a 
relatively less stringent criterion of 10-point change in VAS from pre to post-sad induction.  This 
criterion produced a 71% success rate (N =116), which is the range found in previous research 
using both university students and those with remitted major depression (e.g., 69% [Clark & 
Teasdale, 1985], 75% [Martin, 1990], 81% [Singer & Dobson, 2009], and 86% [Singer & 
Dobson, 2007]). Moreover, there were no between-condition differences in sad mood induction 
success rate determined using this criterion, !2 (3, N = 163) = 0.84, p= .84. Successful induction, 
as measured with this criterion, also seemed unrelated to gender (!2 [1, N = 163] = .08, p = .77), 




Distressing images task. Because there are no empirically or conceptually clear pre and 
post assessment points for the distressing images task, I initially required a shift of 20 points 
between pre-sad mood induction VAS and the highest VAS rating during the distressing images 
task to consider this induction successful. This method produced a 65% success rate (N = 110), 
with no condition differences observed, !2 (3, N = 164) = 4.64, p = .20. However, to keep the 
inclusion criteria between different parts of the study similar, I ultimately decided to set the 
induction success criterion for the distressing images test to a 10-point VAS shift, which 
produced a success rate of 85% (N =142), with no between-condition differences, !2 (3, N = 164) 
= 6.52, p = .08. Successful induction, as measured with this criterion, also seemed unrelated to 
gender (!2 [1, N = 163] = 0.18, p = .67), or age, t (134) = .0.85, p = .39. 
Checking compliance. Because there is evidence that compliance with experimental 
instructions enhances effects of acceptance (Singer & Dobson, 2009), participants in all active 
conditions were screened for compliance with instructions for both inductions. In keeping with 
prior research (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b), participants were classified as compliant 
within a given induction if they indicate they responded more in the manner instructed than half 
the time (i.e., respond a 4 [half the time] or higher on a scale of 0/[never] to 8 [always]). Only 
data from those who complied with experimental instructions were used in further analyses for 
each induction.  
Sad mood induction. For the sad mood induction, 85% of subjects (N = 136) across 
conditions reported following their given instructions at least half the time (i.e., reported 
complying), with significant between-groups differences, !2 (3, N = 137) = 9.06, p = .03. In order 
to understand this finding, a series of follow-up orthogonal likelihood chi-squared contrast was 




other conditions. Results suggested that 71% of participants in the Judgment condition reported 
complying with their given instruction at least half the time, a significantly lower rate of 
compliance than the rate of compliance in all other groups averaged together, L2 (1, N= 163) = 
6.29, p = .01.  None of the other conditions significantly differed in rates of compliance 
(Awareness = 85%; Distancing = 87%, and Compassion = 94%). Over all, rates of compliance 
were in the range observed in previous studies (i.e., between 60% [Singer & Dobson, 2009] and 
90% [Singer & Dobson, 2007]).  
Distressing images task. For the distress tolerance task, 76% of participants (N = 128) 
across conditions reportedly complied (i.e., engaged in their instructed in-task behavior at least 
half the time), with significant between-condition differences in rates of reported compliance (!2 
(3, N = 163) = 39.11, p < .001. Follow-up orthogonal likelihood chi-square contrasts suggested 
that participants in the Judgment condition reported complying at significantly lower percentages 
(45%) than participants in any of the other conditions, L2 (1, N = 164) = 34.59, p < .001. All 
other conditions had relatively equivalent compliance rates (Awareness = 95%, Distancing  = 
90%, and Compassion = 82%). 
Final sample demographics. The above analyses produced two separate, but related 
samples- one who provided usable data for the sad mood induction (e.g., people who reported at 
least a 10-point VAS shift pre-post sad mood induction and reported complying with in-task 
behavior at least half of the time), and one of subjects who provided usable data for the 
distressing images task (e.g., same criteria applied to the distressing images task). Of the 138 
people who provided usable data for at least one of the manipulations, only approximately 51% 




further analyses were done separately for those who provided usable data for either each of the 
manipulations.  
Sad mood induction. For the sad mood induction, approximately 60% of all participants 
(N = 98) both complied with the instructions and reported a shift of at least 10 points in the VAS. 
The average age of these subjects was 20 years (SD = 2.75, range = 18-37), and they identified 
as Women (N = 61, 62.2%), White (65%, N = 63), Black (N = 14, 14.4%), Hispanic (N = 8, 
8.2%), Native American (N = 3, 3.1%) and Other (N = 9, 9.3%).  
Distressing images task. Similarly, for the distressing images task, approximately 68% of 
all participants (N = 111) both complied with their instructions and experienced a shift of at least 
10 points at some time during the task. These subjects were largely Women (N = 68, 61.3%), had 
an average age of around 20 years (SD = 3.70, range = 18-46) and identified as White (N = .74, 
66.7%), Black (N = 14, 12.7%), Hispanic (N = 8, 7,2%), Asian American (N = 5, 4.5%), Native 
American (N = 2, 1.8%), and Other (N =7, 6.3%).  
Hypothesis-Driven Analyses 
Analytic overview. All between-condition hypotheses were tested in SPSS using a 2-step 
process. The first step in this process was testing the existence of any significant between-
condition differences in the three dependent measures (meta-distress, experiential avoidance, 
curious investigation) separately for each induction, with an additional analysis for distress 
tolerance only for the distressing images task. A series of one-way ANOVAs was used for this 
purpose. For any significant omnibus findings, specific hypotheses were evaluated using three 
planned orthogonal contrasts (see Table 1). I planned to test mediation hypotheses in the second 
step in AMOS using these same contrast codes only if there were robust omnibus findings both 




Results for experiential avoidance. There were no significant between-condition 
differences in experiential avoidance in either the sad mood induction, (REQ-SM; F [3, 93] = 
1.35, p = .26) or the distressing images task (REQ-DT), F (3, 106) = 0.79, p = .49.  
Results for meta-distress. All measures of post-task meta-distress were significantly 
skewed and kurtotic. As such, natural log transformations were performed on these variables, 
creating new variables LG10-DERS-NA-SM (log-transformed DERS-NA-SM) and LG10-
DERS-NA-DT (log-transformed DERS-NA-DT). For the sad mood induction, the results of a 
one-way ANOVA found no significant between-condition differences in post-task meta-distress 
(LG10-DERS-NA-SM), F (3, 93) = 1.59, p = .19. For the distressing images task, a one-way 
ANOVA found a small magnitude marginally significant effect of condition on post-task meta-
distress (LG10-DERS-NA-DT), F (3, 06) = 2.56, p = .06, $p2 = .08. Follow-up contrasts 
suggested that the Judgment (M = 0.98) condition endorsed significant greater log-transformed 
meta-distress (LG10-DERS-NA-DT) than did the other conditions, #M = 0.20, SD# = .09, p = 
.03. No other contrasts were significant.  
Results for curious investigation. No significant differences in curious investigation 
were found for either the sad mood induction (TMS-C-SM), F (3, 93) = 0.79, p = .50 or the 
distressing images task, (TMS-C-DT), F (3, 110) = 0.89, p = .45. 
Results for distress tolerance. Finally for the distressing images task only, an ANOVA  
found no significant differences  in average distress tolerance (AV-DT), F(3, 106) = 0.90, p = 
.44. 
Follow-up mediation analyses. Because omnibus results failed to find condition 




only Hypothesis 1b (that participants in the judgment condition would experience greater meta-
distress than those in the other conditions) was further explored. 
Planned Exploratory Analyses 
Scoring repeated measures In order to increase sensitivity and account for the 
possibility of biased post-task recall, hypothesis-driven analyses were repeated using the average 
of the in-task measures of meta-distress, experiential avoidance, and curious exploration. As a 
reminder, participants completed five measurements of distress, experiential avoidance, and 
curious exploration during each induction task.  There were averaged, separately for each 
induction, leaving one score between 0 and 8 for each of these dependent variables within each 
distress induction. 
Analytic overview. All between-condition hypotheses were tested as described above 
using the average repeated-measures of experiential avoidance (EA-AV-SM and EA-AV-DT), 
meta-distress (MD-AV-SM and MD-AV-DT), and curious investigation (Curiosity-AV-SM and 
Curiosity-AV-DT).  
Results for experiential avoidance. There were no significant between-condition 
differences in experiential avoidance in the sad mood induction (EA-AV-SM; F [3, 93] = 0.71, p 
= .55) or the distressing images task (EA-AV-DT), F (3, 106) = 1.24, p = .29.  
Results for meta-distress. Measures of in-task meta-distress were significantly skewed 
and kurtotic. As such, natural log transformations were performed on these variables. There were 
no significant between-condition differences in log-transformed post-task meta-distress for either 
the sad mood induction (LG10-MD-AV-SM; F [3, 93] = 1.14, p = .34) or the distressing images 




Results for curious investigation. For the sad mood induction, an ANOVA found 
marginally significant medium-sized differences in curious investigation (Curiosity-AV-SM), F 
(3, 93) = 2.48, p = .06, $p2 = .08. Follow-up contrasts suggested that the Compassion (M = 5.76) 
condition endorsed significant greater curiosity towards their experiences than did the Distancing 
condition (M = 4.60), #M = 1.16, SD# = .56, p = .04. No other contrasts were significant. For the 
distressing images task, an ANOVA found no significant condition differences in curious 
investigation (Curiosity-AV-DT), F (3, 106) = 2.39, p = .07.  
Understanding factors influencing experimental compliance. In order to help 
understand how to promote compliance with experimental instructions and identify individual 
characteristics that seem to be related to compliance with each set of instructions, the association 
between compliance in each condition and trait characteristics, initial comprehension (number of 
errors), perceived credibility of the video, and perceived utility of the instructions were analyzed 
using zero-order correlations. Despite costs to power, I felt it was best to analyze compliance 
separately for group who received a given set of instructions for each task, as it seems likely that 
different factors may predispose people to comply with each set of fairly distinct instructions. In 
addition, because compliance with instructions is theoretically distinct from success of induction, 
I conducted these analyses using the entire sample. Correlations for the sad mood induction are 
presented in Table 3.  Table 4 contains the associated correlations for the distressing images task. 
Follow-up regression analyses were not conducted due to power limitations.  
The findings in Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that there may not be one single factor or set 
of factors that increased how often participants will follow all possible experimental instructions. 
Indeed, it seems that different factors increase the likelihood of following each set of directions. 




that different factors seem to influence how often participants follow a given set of directions in 
the sad mood induction versus the distressing images task. Interestingly, trait distancing (EQ-
Total) seems to have been associated with increased compliance with most types of instructions 
provided in the distressing image task (Table 4).  
Unplanned Exploratory Analyses 
 I conducted a set of unplanned exploratory analyses to examine a series of explanations 
for the lack of significant between-condition findings. The first set of analyses focused on the 
possibility that, even within those who complied with their given instructions and were 
successfully induced into negative moods, the conditions did not differ in terms of how often 
they judged distressing emotions, adopted a distanced perspective from distressing emotions, and 
compassionately appraised distressing emotions. Because of the complexity of this study, I 
feared that telling a given condition not to do something (e.g., telling people in the Judgment 
condition not to compassionately appraise distress) might lead them to actually engage in that 
behavior. As such, no condition was specifically forbidden from engaging in the types of 
behaviors manipulated in other conditions. Therefore, out-of-condition compliance was not 
considered non-compliant. It would be possible, for instance, to appraise distress judgmentally 
approximately half the time (i.e., to comply sufficiently in the Judgment condition), but also to 
appraise it compassionately the other half of the time (i.e., to comply with the Compassion 
condition without having actually been provided those instructions). The possibility that 
participants did engage in out-of-condition behaviors, thus, warrants examination. Table 5 
contains the average “compliance” score for each type of instruction in each condition. 
There are two ways in which participants might not have significantly differed in how 




emotions, and compassionately appraised their distress. Firstly, the average amount of these 
behaviors might not have varied in expected ways between conditions. While I would expect that 
conditions that were told to behave in a certain way would have done so at higher rates than 
those who were not told to do so, there is the possibility that this did not occur. The second set of 
circumstances that might confound between-condition comparisons is if participants within a 
given condition did not engage in target behaviors (e.g., judgmental appraisal in the Judgment 
condition) significantly more of the time than they engaged in other out-of condition behaviors 
(e.g., holding a distanced perspective from distress in the Judgment condition). That is, while I 
would anticipate that participants followed experimental instructions to a greater degree than 
they engaged in out-of-condition behaviors, there is a possibility that they did not. Finally, it is 
possible that trait dispositions, in addition to (and sometimes in contradiction to) experimental 
instructions, predicted engaging in the desired behaviors (e.g., judging emotions, viewing them 
from a distanced perspective, or judging them compassionately), and thus predicted measured 
outcomes (e.g., meta-distress, experiential avoidance, curious investigation, and distress 
tolerance).  
Examining out-of-condition compliance.  If the manipulation worked as expected, I 
would expect that participants who were told to behave in a certain way would have done so at 
higher rates than those who were not told to do so. Specifically, I would expect that participants 
in the Judgment condition would have more often judgmentally appraised their distress than 
participants in any of the other conditions. Similarly, I would anticipate that participants in both 
the Distancing and Compassion conditions would have more often held a distanced perspective 




that participants in the Compassion condition would report more often compassionately 
appraising distress than those in any other condition. 
Analyzing between-condition differences in reported in-task behavior/compliance. I 
examined the hypothesized between-condition differences in reported time spent following 
instructions (i.e., compliance) by conducting a series of ANOVAs probing condition differences 
in continuously scored compliance with each of the three condition instructions (judgment, 
distancing, and compassion). Because these analyses were intended to shed light on the failure of 
omnibus tests to find differences in outcomes, these ANOVAs were conducted using data from 
individuals who reported complying with their given instructions at least half the time. I 
followed up these ANOVAs with Tukey’s HSD tests to examine differences between all 
combinations of conditions.    
Between-condition differences in reported judgmental appraisal. In the sad mood 
induction, there were medium to large-sized between-condition differences in endorsement of 
judgmentally appraising distress, F (3, 96) = 9.86 p < .001, $p2 = .24. Moreover, as expected, 
participants in the Judgment condition reported judgmentally appraising distress “often (60-
70%)” and reported doing so significantly more often than participants in any other condition, 
who all reported judgmentally appraising distress “sometimes (30-40%)” on average. As 
expected, none of the other conditions differed.  Similar results emerged for the distressing 
images task. In the distressing images task, there were large magnitude between-condition 
differences in judgmentally appraising distress F (3,110) = 19.61, p < .001, $p2 = .35. Here also, 
participants in the Judgment condition reported judgmentally appraising their distress “more than 
half the time (50-60%)” and reportedly did so significantly more often than participants in any of 




their distress and reportedly did so significantly more often than those in the Awareness 
condition. As expected, no other conditions were significantly different from one another in 
reported in-session judgmental appraisal of distress. 
Between-condition differences in reported distanced perspective on distress. For the sad 
mood induction, there were moderate between-condition differences in reported adoption of a 
distanced perspective on distress, F (3, 96) = 6.59, p < .001, $p2 = .14. As expected, participants 
in the Distancing and Compassion conditions reported viewing distress from a distanced 
perspective significantly more often than participant sin the Judgment condition. Unexpectedly, 
people in the Distancing and Compassion conditions, who employed this skill “often (60-70%)” 
did not relate to their distress from a distance perspective more often than people in the 
Awareness condition, who reported viewing their distressing emotions from a distanced 
perspective “more than half the time (50-60%).”  
For the distressing images task, similarly moderate magnitude differences in distancing 
emerged, F (3,110) = 6.18, p = .001, $p2 = .15.  Follow-up tests produced largely anticipated 
results. People in the Distancing condition reportedly employed this skill “often (60-70%)” and 
reported doing so significantly more often than participants in the Judgment and Awareness 
conditions, who did so “about half the time (40-50%).” Moreover, as anticipated, the 
Compassion condition endorsed greater distancing than those in the Awareness condition. 
However, unexpectedly, the Judgment and Compassion conditions did not differ on distancing, 
which both reported doing about “half the time.”  
Between-condition differences in reported compassionate appraisal. Medium magnitude 
condition differences in reported compassionate appraisal of distressing emotions conformed to 




the sad mood induction, the Compassion condition reported compassionately appraising distress 
“often (60-70%)” (M = 6.48) and reportedly did so significantly more often than did participants 
in any other condition. No other conditions evidenced significant differences in compassionately 
appraising emotions. Moreover, identical results emerged in the distressing images task, F 
(3,110) = 7.64, p < .001, $p2 = .18. 
Analyzing reported use of skills/ compliance of instructions within each condition. I 
next turned my attention to the question of whether, within each condition, participants who 
reported complying with their given instructions engaged more often in the desired behaviors 
versus the out-of-condition behaviors. I anticipated here that people who reportedly complied 
within the Judgment condition would endorse significantly more time spent judgmentally 
appraising distress than either holding distress in a distanced perspective or compassionately 
appraising distress. Similarly, I expected that reportedly compliant participants in either the 
Distancing or Compassion conditions spent more of their time viewing distress from a distanced 
perspective than judging distress. People who indicated that they complied in the Distancing 
condition, similarly, I expected to have spent more of their time holding a distanced perspective 
from distress than compassionately appraising distress. I examined these possibilities in a series 
of repeated measures ANOVAS followed up with simple contrasts comparing participants’ 
average reported in-task judgmental appraisal, distanced perspective, and compassionate 
appraisal as repeated measures separately for each active condition in each induction.  
Analyzing reported in-task behaviors/compliance in the judgment condition. As 
anticipated, participants in the Judgment condition for the sad mood induction evidenced 
moderate sized differences between types of in-task behavior, F(2, 38.35) = 8.64, p < .001, $p2  = 




much more often than they either viewed distress from a distanced perspective (F[1, 25] = 25.53, 
p < .001, $p2  = .52) or compassionately appraised distress, F(1, 25) = 8.47, p < .01, $p2= .25. 
Similar results emerged for the distressing images task. Participants in the Judgment condition 
evidenced moderate-sized differences in reported in-task behaviors in the distressing images 
task, F (2, 34) = 4.55, p = .02, $p2 = .21. Specifically, they reported judgmentally appraising 
distress much more frequently than they either viewed distress from a distanced perspective, (F 
[1, 25)] = 38.31, p = .01, $p2 = .32) or compassionately appraised distress, F (1, 25) = 89.41, p < 
.01, $p2 = .35.  
Analyzing reported in-task behaviors/compliance in the distancing condition. Participants 
in the Distancing condition evidenced large differences in within-task behaviors during the sad 
mood induction, F (2, 42) = 8.91, p = .001, $p2 = .30. As expected participants in the Distancing 
condition in the sad mood induction also reported viewing distress from a distanced perspective 
far more often than they appraised distress either judgmentally (F[1, 21] = 16.36, p = .001, $p2 = 
.44) or compassionately, F(1, 21) = 8.44, p < .01, $p2 = .29. Similarly, participants in the 
Distancing condition also evidenced large differences in reported within-task behaviors in the 
distressing images task, F (2, 58) = 19.02, p < .001, $p2 = .39. As expected, these participants 
viewed distress from a distanced perspective far more often than they appraised distress either 
judgmentally (F [1, 29] = 54.59, p < .001, $p2 = .65) or compassionately, F (1, 29) = 14.91, p = 
.001, $p2 = .34.  
 Analyzing reported in-task behaviors in the compassion condition. Participants in the 
Compassion condition evidenced large differences in reported within-task behaviors during the 
sad mood induction, F (2, 52) = 31.49, p < .001, $p2 = .55. Specifically, as expected, these 




.001, $p2 = .54) and compassionately appraising distress (F [1, 26] = 46.20, p < .001, $p2 = .64) 
far more often than they judgmentally appraised distress. Identical results emerged among 
members of the Compassion condition in the distressing images task, F (2, 50) = 45.89, p < .001, 
$p2 = .64. Just as in the sad mood induction, participants in the Compassion condition reported 
both viewing distress from a distanced perspective (F [1, 25] = 38.31, p < .001, $p2 = .61) and 
compassionately appraising distress (F [1, 25] = 89.41, p < .001, $p2 = .78) far more often than 
they reported judgmentally appraised distress, 
Summary of reported compliance. Overall, it appears that participants who complied 
with their given instructions reportedly followed those directions (e.g., judgmentally appraised 
distress in the Judgment condition) more often than they reportedly engaged in behaviors they 
were not asked to do (e.g., compassionately appraising in the Judgment condition). It is notable 
that effect sizes were larger for participants in the Compassion condition than they were for those 
in other conditions. Moreover, given the relatively high out-of-condition use of distancing and 
compassionate appraisal, and the unexpected finding that judgmental appraisal was elevated in 
the Distancing condition versus other conditions, the above results suggest between-condition 
analyses may have been confounded by unanticipated behaviors on the parts of the participants.  
Examining the impact of personality traits, condition instructions, and in-task 
behaviors on dependent variables. The possibility that both the experimental instructions and 
individual dispositions may have influenced in-task behaviors and thereby influenced salient 
outcome measures was assessed in a series of path models in AMOS (Arbuckle, 2007). Zero-
order correlations were used to identify potential correlates of post-task measures of meta-
distress, experiential avoidance, curiosity, and distress tolerance. These correlations were run 




induction (N = 114; Table 6) or the distressing images task (N = 140; Table 7). Zero-order 
correlations were also used to identify significant correlates of participant reported within-
induction behaviors/use of instructed skills for successfully induced participants in the sad mood 
induction (Table 8) and the distressing images task (Table 9). Finally, zero-order correlations 
between trait measures are presented in Table 10 (sad mood induction) and Table 11 (distressing 
images task). In order not to restrict the range of reported in-task behaviors, these correlations 
and path models included data from individuals who had reported they had complied with given 
instructions less than half the time. 
I anticipated that in-session judgmental appraisal would be significantly directly 
associated with greater reported experiential avoidance and meta-distress in both inductions. 
Moreover, I anticipated that being in the Judgment condition would be indirectly associated with 
greater experiential avoidance and meta-distress via leading to more frequent reported 
judgmental appraisal of distress in both inductions. Similarly, I anticipated that reported 
frequency of both distancing and compassionate appraisal would be directly associated with 
more frequent reported curious investigation and longer distress tolerance for both inductions. 
Moreover, I hypothesized that being in either the Distancing or Compassion condition would be 
associated with greater reported curious investigation and longer distress tolerance via leading to 
more frequent reported use of a distanced perspective from distress in both inductions. Finally, I 
anticipated that being in the Compassion condition would be associated with more frequently 
responding to distress with curious investigation than being in the Distancing condition and that 
this difference would be attributable to more frequent reported compassionate appraisals of 




Models for each of the dependent measures are depicted in figures 1– 5. As detailed 
below, two path models failed to account for significant variance in the measured outcome and 
are not depicted in figures. A conservative approach to assessing the significance of indirect 
effects was followed, wherein path models were first estimated including direct paths from 
condition contrast codes to the outcome in question (see Table 2). If this full model fit the data 
adequately, direct paths were removed and decrement to model fit was assessed using chi-
squared difference tests. If fit was unharmed, then the trimmed model was used to test 
hypotheses. Otherwise, the full model was used to examine hypotheses. Finally, the robustness 
of the significance of all squared multiple correlations, standardized direct effects, and 
standardized indirect effects was assessed using 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals across 
1000 bootstrapped samples (Shrout & Bolger, 2002) for the retained model. In-task behaviors 
were allowed to have correlated error terms in all models.  
Path models predicting meta-distress (Figure 1). The first model I tested was designed to 
explore factors influencing meta-distress experienced in the sad mood induction (DERS-NA-
SM). Removing direct effects from the condition contrasts to the DERS-NA-SM did not 
significantly worsen model fit, !2% (3, N = 114) = 3.13, p = .37. Moreover, the trimmed model 
for the data well (Figure 1). The trimmed model accounted for approximately 38% of the 
variance in DERS-NA-SM, sr2 = .38, p = .02. Within the model, meta-distress (DERS-NA-SM) 
was negatively associated with trait non- judgmental appraisal of and was positively associated 
trait meta-distress. Post-task meta-distress (DERS-NA-SM) was not associated with any of the 
other entered variables, either directly or indirectly.  
The second path model I tested was designed to explore factors influencing meta-distress 




fit, !2% (3, N = 140) = 7.35, p = .05, so the initial model was retained for further analysis. The 
initial model fit the data well, though it failed to account for significant variance in meta-distress, 
!2 (10, N = 140) = 13.05, p = .22, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .05, CFI = .99, sr2 = .16, p = .07. 
Given that this model failed to account for significant variance in the outcome, no figure is 
presented. 
Path models predicting experiential avoidance (Figures 2 and 3). The third path model I 
tested was designed to explore factors influencing experiential avoidance employed in the sad 
mood induction (REQ-SM). Removing direct effects from the condition contrasts to the REQ-
SM did not significantly worsen model fit, !2% (3, N = 114) = 3.13, p = .37.  Moreover, the 
trimmed model fit (Figure 2) the data well and accounted for 19% of the variance in post-task 
experiential avoidance (REQ-SM; sr2 = .19, p = .04. Within this model, only appraising distress 
judgmentally (Judge-SM) was significantly associated with greater experiential avoidance (REQ-
SM). The total model accounted for 17% of the variance in in-session judgmental appraisals 
(Judge-SM; sr2 = .17, p = .03). The only factor that seemed to influence in-session judgmental 
appraisal (Judge-SM) was being in the Judgment condition (versus being in all other conditions). 
There were no significant indirect effects.  
The fourth path model I tested was designed to explore factors influencing experiential 
avoidance employed in the distressing images task (REQ-DT). Removing direct effects from the 
condition contrasts to the REQ-SM did not significantly worsen model fit and resulted in a well 
fitting trimmed model (Figure 3), !2% (3, N = 140) = 1.89, p = .59. The trimmed model 
accounted for approximately 24% of the variance in REQ-DT, sr2 = .24, p = 03. Post-task 
experiential avoidance (REQ-DT) was associated with higher trait fear of emotions (ACS-Total) 




trimmed model accounted for approximately 14% of the variance in Judgmentally appraising 
distress (Judge-DT), sr2 = .14, p = .02. In tern, Judge-DT was associated with being in the 
Judgment condition. Moreover, it seemed that higher trait meta-distress (DERS-NA) had a 
significant indirect association with REQ-DT via Judge-DT, " = .04, p = .03. 
Path models predicting curious investigation (Figures 4 and 5). The fifth path model I 
tested was designed to explore factors influencing curious investigation of distress in the sad 
mood induction (TMS-C-SM). Trimming the model did not result in reduced model fit, !2% (3, N 
= 114) = 1.66, p = .65.  The trimmed model fit the data well (Figure 4) and accounted for 
approximately 22% of the variance in TMS-C-SM, sr2 = .22.  In this induction, TMS-C-SM was 
associated with male gender and higher levels of in-session compassionate appraisal of distress 
(Compassion-SM). In turn, Compassion-SM was positively associated with being in one of the 
two conditions in which distancing instructions were provided (i.e., the Distancing and 
Compassion conditions versus the Judgment and Awareness conditions) and it was greater in the 
Compassion condition than in the Distancing condition. The total trimmed model accounted for 
approximately 14% of the variance in Compassion-SM, sr2 = .14, p = .02. As expected, being in 
either of the two conditions in which distancing instructions were given was indirectly associated 
with greater TMS-C-SM via Compassion-SM.  Similarly, being in the Compassion condition 
was associated with higher TMS-C-SM via leading to greater Compassion-SM. 
The sixth path model I tested was designed to explore factors influencing curious 
investigation of distress in the distressing images task (TMS-C-DT). Trimming the model did not 
result in reduced model fit, !2% (3, N = 140) = 3.96, p = .27.  The trimmed model fit the data 
adequately (Figure 5) and accounted for approximately 25% of the variance in TMS-C-SM, sr2 = 




distancing (Distancing-DT) and in-session compassionate appraisal of distress (Compassion-
DT). In turn, Distancing-DT was positively associated with being in one of the two conditions in 
which distancing instructions were provided (i.e., the Distancing and Compassion conditions 
versus the Judgment and Awareness conditions). Compassion-DT was also positively associated 
with receiving distancing instructions (i.e., being in either the Distancing or Compassion 
conditions) and it was greater in the Compassion condition than in the Distancing condition. The 
total trimmed model accounted for approximately 17% of the variance in Distancing-DT (sr2 = 
.17, p = .01) and approximately 12% of the variance in Compassion-SM, sr2 = .12, p < .01. As 
expected, being in either of the two conditions in which distancing instructions were given was 
indirectly associated with greater TMS-C-DT via Distancing-DT and Compassion-DT.  
However, contrary to expectations, being in the Compassion condition was not indirectly 
associated with significantly greater TMS-C-DT as compared to being in the Distancing 
condition. 
Path model predicting distress tolerance. The seventh and last path model I tested was 
designed to explore factors influencing average distress tolerance in the distressing images task 
(DT-AV). Four people’s data were excluded from this analysis because they never reported 
experiencing distress during the distressing images task. Based on zero-order correlations, there 
were no trait-level correlates of DT-AV. Trimming the model did not result in reduced model fit, 
!2% (3, N = 137) = 4.91, p = .15, so the trimmed model was retained for further analysis. The 
trimmed model fit the data well, though it failed to account for significant variance in DT-AV, !2 
(6, N = 137) = 5.71, p = .46, SRMR = .03, RMSEA < .01, CFI = 1.0, sr2 = .02, p = .13.  Because 






Summary of Findings 
 Overall, there were no significant condition differences in any of the dependent measures 
for participants who both experienced a 10-point shift in mood in the induction and reportedly 
followed experimental instructions at least half the time. There were two marginally significant 
differences, which suggested that the Judgment condition endorsed a marginally higher degree of 
meta-distress than the other conditions for the distressing images task and that the Compassion 
condition endorsed marginally greater curious exploration than the Distancing condition in the 
sad mood induction. Both findings were as predicted, although smaller in magnitude than 
anticipated. I conducted follow-up analyses that suggest several potential explanations for the 
null findings. 
The Role of Induction Failure 
The first possible factor contributing to null findings here is the low rates of response to 
the induction (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a; 2006b; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009). The 
choice to focus on an emotionally healthy sample may have reduced the impact of the induction 
and, thereby, the effects of the manipulation. Rates of successful response (as typically means a 
20-point shift in the VAS; Singer & Dobson, 2007) were so low, in fact that the choice was made 
to accept a 10-point shift as evidence of induction in the present study. Given that all 
experimental instructions pre-supposed successful induction, such a difference alone could have 
accounted for null findings. My choice to anchor the VAS from 0 (Happy) to 100 (Very 
Distressed), as has only been done in samples of individuals with diagnoses of major depressive 
disorder (Singer & Dobson, 2007; Singer & Dobson, 2009) may also have inflated rates of 




All Distressed) to 100 (Extremely Distressed) as has been done more commonly in induction 
research (Birch, Stewart, Wall, McKee, Eisnor, & Theakston, 2004; McKee, Wall, Hinson, 
Goldstein, & Bissonnette, 2003). It is also worth noting that most of these studies did not set 
induction success criteria and simply assessed general induction success using pre-post change in 
VAS. 
The Role of Comprehension, Use of Unrequested Behaviors, and Trait Dispositions  
For predictions involving experiential avoidance and meta-distress. Many of the 
hypotheses regarding the impact of judgmental appraisal were likely confounded by a series of 
factors negatively impacting interpretability of the data in the Judgment condition.  Despite the 
fact that participants in this condition seem to almost all have understood that they were being 
asked to judgmentally appraise distress, up to 55% reported they followed these instructions less 
than half of the time in either induction. These rates of use of experimental instructions are 
significantly lower than those observed in all other conditions in this study, suggesting these 
instructions were not acceptable to participants. Indeed, anecdotally some participants reported 
they did not believe those appraisals were correct or useful to employ. 
Moreover, while reportedly compliance participants in the Judgment condition did report 
judgmentally appraising distress significantly more often than they said they viewed it from a 
distanced perspective or compassionately appraised it , they also did both of these things at 
unexpectedly high rates.  Most obviously, almost half of the compliant participants in the 
Judgment and Awareness conditions believed they were being asked to view distress from a 
distanced perspective and a third believed they were being asked to compassionately appraise 




participants in these conditions indicated that they both compassionately appraised distress and 
viewed it from a distanced perspective approximately “half the time” in both inductions.  
Although the reasons for confusion are unclear, perhaps watching a psycho-educational 
video about distancing contributed to these confounding behaviors and associated confounded 
results. It is also possible that these relatively psychologically healthy participants simply fell 
back into adaptive habits in the inductions. Simply put, perhaps they were too psychologically 
healthy to be coached to engage in pathological patterns of judgment and disengage from 
healthier ways of relating to distress, at least not in such a time-limited study. In fact, some 
anecdotal evidence suggested to us that participants who indicated they judgmentally appraised 
distress did not, in fact, do so because they did not believe it to be appropriate. Instead, they 
believed their emotions were valid and worthwhile. While, of course, this is positive for them, 
the result for the present study is that expected findings for meta-distress and experiential 
avoidance are likely confounded by low rates of judgmental appraisal and higher-than-
anticipated rates of compassionate appraisal and distancing in the Judgment condition. 
In fact, I found some support for the idea that individual dispositions, rather than 
experimental instructions, significantly predicted in-task meta-distress and experiential 
avoidance, in some cases because these traits are linked to greater in-task judgmental appraisal.  
For example, when accounting for all reported in-task behaviors and individual dispositions, only 
individual dispositions towards judgmentally appraise distressing emotions (FFMQ-NJ) and 
experiencing greater meta-distress (DERS-NonAccept), were associated with greater meta-
distress in the sad mood induction (DERS-NA-SM; Figure 1). Similarly, while judgmentally 
appraising distress seemed associated with greater in-task experiential avoidance in both 




the individual dispositions towards feeling greater meta-distress (i.e., higher DERS-NonAccept), 
rather than being told to judgmentally appraise distress in this experiment. In fact, this individual 
disposition seemed to be linked to such a significant increase in judgmental appraisal in task 
(regardless of experimental condition) that it appeared to possibly lead to greater in-task 
experiential avoidance via this route (Figure 3). Going forward with this knowledge, it may be 
best to recruit samples of individuals who are more likely to judgmentally appraise distress as a 
matter of habit (e.g., Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a), such as those with clinical anxiety (Campbell-
Sills et al., 2006b) or depression (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009).  
Results pertaining to distress tolerance and curious investigation. Results pertaining 
to distress tolerance and curious investigation were relatively less confounded than those for 
meta-distress and experiential avoidance.  Firstly, none of the measured in-task behaviors 
appeared robustly associated with greater distress tolerance in the distressing images task (see 
Table 7), suggesting that the manipulations honestly had no impact on distress tolerance. Results 
for curious investigation were somewhat less straightforward, as explained below.  
Over all and in stark contrast to the behaviors of participants who were asked to engage 
in theoretically pathological behaviors (i.e., judgmental appraisal), participants who were asked 
to engage in theoretically healthier methods of relating to emotions (e.g., distancing and 
compassionate appraisal) seem overwhelmingly to have understood what they were being asked 
to do and to have done so. However, perhaps again due to the healthy nature of the sample, more 
than a third of the participants in the Distancing condition thought they were being asked to 
compassionately appraise distress. Moreover, reportedly compliant participants in the Distancing 
condition did, in fact, report compassionately appraising distress at least half the time, even after 




and Compassion conditions pertaining to the effect of compassionate appraisal on curious 
investigation may have been obscured by the use of compassionate appraisal in the Distancing 
condition. 
The results of a path model designed to account for any potentially confounding in-task 
behaviors largely supported hypotheses (Figure 4 and Figure 5). In contrast, again, to results for 
judgmental appraisal, it does seem that experimental instructions successfully lead to use of both 
distancing and compassionate appraisal in session. In fact, for the distressing images task, 
receiving distancing instructions was associated with greater reported in-task curious 
investigation of distress because it was associated with such a significant increase in reported in-
task use of distancing (Figure 5). So it is possible to increase curious investigation of distress by 
instructing participants to relate to distress from a distanced perspective, as anticipated. 
The present findings also yield some support for the hypothesis that compassionately 
appraising distress may be associated with even greater curious investigation than viewing 
distress from a distanced perspective. Even when controlling for the influence of in-task reported 
distancing, in-task reported compassionate appraisal was directly associated with reported 
curious investigation of distress in both inductions (Figures 4 and 5). For the sad mood 
induction, data were consistent with the supposition that participants in either the Distancing or 
Compassion conditions reported higher levels of curious investigation (TMS-C-SM) specifically 
because they also more often compassionately appraised distress (Figure 4). Moreover, data from 
this induction even suggest that individuals in the Compassion condition endorsed curiously 
investigating distress more often than participants in the Distancing condition because they 
compassionately appraised their distress more often (Figure 4). Total findings are consistent with 




byproduct of adopting a distanced perspective, leads to greater curiosity about distressing 
emotions.   
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Improving internal validity. One significant limitation of the present study’s internal 
validity was the exclusive reliance on self-report measures of in-task behaviors and emotional 
responses. Given that there is no way of checking for the accuracy of reported emotions, the 
exclusive use of self-report to gauge compliance with experimental instructions is most troubling 
(and potentially more readily corrected) methodological limitation of this study. While other 
studies have used self-report to assess in-task behaviors/ compliance with experimental 
instructions (e.g., Atkinson & Wade, 2012; Campbell-Sills et al., 2006b), these methods leave 
experimenters with no way of gauging the accuracy of participant reports. This issue is 
particularly salient in this study because there were some anecdotal suggestions that participants 
who reported judgmentally appraising distress in the Judgment condition did not, in fact, do so. 
Future studies might include a speak-aloud procedure with expert coders to measure or confirm 
use of experimental instructions, as was done by Singer and Dobson (2007; 2009). 
 The second threat to this study’s internal validity arises from the fact that the judgmental 
appraisal instructions do not appear to have been well received or implemented by participants in 
the Judgment condition. As such, the present data do not speak to the validity of the hypothesis 
that judgmental appraising distress leads to greater meta-distress and experiential avoidance. 
Given evidence that clinical samples (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a) or psychologically healthy 
individuals with higher trait dispositions towards judgmentally appraising distress or 




appraise distress, hypotheses related to the impact of judgmental appraisal are likely better tested 
in those samples.  
 Furthermore, unexpectedly high rates of either reportedly viewing distress from a 
distanced perspective or compassionately appraising distress in either the Awareness of 
Judgment conditions call into question the wisdom of including psycho-educational materials 
about viewing distress from a distanced perspective. These materials were included in order to 
allow participants to accurately complete post-task measures. However, it seems very possible 
that participants’ confusion about what they were supposed to do during the induction and then 
their unrequested use of distancing and compassionate appraisal may have resulted from 
receiving this psycho-education. As such, future studies might consider removing this piece of 
psycho-education. 
 Similarly, there is a real possibility here that the brevity of this experiment and the lack of 
inclusion of formal mindfulness practices may have rendered these skills less effective or 
impactful than anticipated (as also argued by Low and colleagues [2008] and Shallcross and 
colleagues [2010]). Although the existence of significant indirect effects on measures of curious 
investigation suggest such a brief study may be minimally effective at teaching a complex skill 
like distancing and compassionate appraisal, it is very likely that they might gain even greater 
command of this skill  (or, indeed, any of the skills) if they were to part in formal mindfulness 
practice over several sessions, such as they would in MBSR or MBCT.  As such, providing 
participants more time to practice and more intense mentorship in implementing the desired 
skills would have augmented the internal validity of the present study. 
 Finally, my initial literature review did not reveal a trait measure of either compassionate 




effects of trait differences in these dispositions on in-task behaviors. Future studies might 
consider including the trait version of the Toronto Mindfulness Scales (TMS-T; Davis, Lau, & 
Cairns, 2009), which provides measures of both distancing and curiosity.  As far as I am aware, 
there is no measure of dispositional compassionate appraisal of distress, which is somewhat 
different from the related construct of self-compassion as assessed in the Self-Compassion Scale 
(SCS: Neff, 2003). Specifically, while the common humanity subscale of the SCS gets at the 
same idea as believing that emotions are natural, the SCS doesn’t include a focus on believing 
emotions are informative or can help one to grow. 
 Improving external validity.  The largest threat to the external validity of the present 
study was the use of a psychologically healthy sample. Although this sample was chosen 
strategically, it had the unintended consequence of causing measurable inflation in the rates of 
induction failure. Simply put, the present sample may not be representative of those who 
clinically receive mindfulness-based therapies. Most prior studies that have assessed emotional 
acceptance have done so in populations where emotional acceptance is an important treatment 
target, such as among individuals with diagnoses of anxiety and mood disorders (e.g.; Campbell-
Sills et al., 2006a; 2006b; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009).  Finally, in contrast to other studies in 
this area, the nearly all of the participants in this study were college students. Future studies may 
be conducted among populations for whom emotional acceptance is theoretically a salient focus 
for intervention, such as those with mood, anxiety, and personality pathology. 
 Improving power through simplifying design. A final concern about the present study 
is that the large number of conditions included hampered its execution. Low power was a 
potential contributor to some of the null findings in the present study. Given high documented 




samples (e.g.; Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a; 2006b; Singer & Dobson, 2007; 2009), it may be 
important to simplify future studies so that they only include a maximum of three conditions and 
only include two experimental conditions.  Moreover, given the possibility, as documented here, 
that between-condition differences can be obscured when even compliant participants react to 
emotions in unrequested ways, it may be wise to enhance power by simplifying research designs 
to only those conditions directly involved in primary hypotheses., It may, for example, be 
profitable to break the present study into two component studies: one examining the effects of 
judgmentally appraising distress or compassionately appraising distress, and the other examining 
the benefits of compassionately appraising distress as compared to viewing distress from a 
distanced perspective.  
Future Directions 
 In addition to suggesting a number of potential methodological refinements to improve 
the quality of future research in this area (see above), the present study suggests some additional 
areas of inquiry. For example, the reason results in the two inductions diverged in many 
instances is not presently clear. It is particularly interesting that none of the variables I assessed 
seemed to account for significant variance in meta-distress in the distressing images task, in 
contrast to the sad mood induction. One options to explain this contrast is that the sad mood 
induction and distressing images task induced different emotions. Although the IAPS images 
used in the distressing images task were not selected based on the type of distressing emotion 
associated with the images, we (Veilleux et al., 2013) have anecdotally noted that disgust may be 
associated with many of the images I used in this study. It may be that disgust, although it does 
seem associated with avoidance (e.g. Wolgast et al., 2010), is inherently  “understandable” 




contrast, sadness, the emotion targeted in the sad mood induction, may be more often subject to 
judgmental appraisal. The current study was not designed to assess this possibility and I only 
assessed general distress in order to shorten the length of the study. However, if, indeed, 
different emotions are more or less prone to be judgmentally appraised or experientially avoided, 
that would have interesting implications for the use of MBTs to treat disorders that involve these 
emotions. Future studies may assess or intentionally strive to manipulate different types of 
distressing emotions in order to answer these theoretically important questions. 
 In addition to the possibility that the effects of appraisal may be contingent on the type of 
emotion being appraised, it is also possible that the different specific appraisals described here as 
either judgmental or compassionate may have different impacts on how people respond to those 
emotions. For example, believing that feeling a given emotion signifies personal defect may be 
associated with shame and experiential suppression, whereas believing that an emotion is 
unhelpful may not. Similarly, believing it is possible to learn and grow by experiencing 
distressing emotions may be more strongly associated with curious investigation of that 
distressing emotion than believing that one is justified in experiencing that emotion. I did not 
design this study to address these questions, though they could be of great clinical import 
because they suggest yet more specific types of interventions. Future work is needed to explore 
these possibilities. For example, future work may be designed to build on the present findings by 
examining which type of “compassionate” appraisals may be more strongly linked to curiously 
investigating emotion.  
 Similarly, future work might examine the question of whether certain types of 
“judgmental” appraisals are linked to certain discrete types of meta-distress. One might expect, 




might be associated with shame, whereas potentially thinking that an emotion may block one 
from one’s goals could be associated with anger. Finally, it may be worth considering that 
certain types of meta-distress (e.g., anger versus anxiety versus shame) may have different 
relationships with experiential avoidance. For example, a person who experiences self-directed 
anger about being distressed might punish themselves for that distress by, for example, self-
injuring without the intention of reducing the initial distress (which qualifies as acting out in 
anger, not as utilizing experiential avoidance). By contrast, someone who is embarrassed about 
being distressed might engage in behaviors specifically to suppress that distress (which would 
qualify as experiential avoidance). Unsurprisingly, given the generally sparse research on meta-
distress specifically, these questions are presently unanswered. Future cross-sectional and 
experimental work may help address this gap in the present literature. 
Strengths 
 The present study had several significant strengths based on its design and sample 
methods. This study’s rigorous experimental design is its primary strength. Moreover, the 
methodology used here was strengthened by included elements such as the use of well-validated 
measures, carefully designed psycho-education about salient and intellectually dense constructs 
of interest, video explanations of experimental instructions, and cue cards to aid memory of 
instructions. In addition, the sample was relatively diverse in terms of gender and ethnic makeup. 
Moreover, approximately half the sample had academic majors aside from psychology.  
Importantly, the current study also represents a strong initial attempt to experimentally 
test the theoretically and clinically salient question of whether judgmentally appraising distress 
leads to potentially negative reactions to emotions, such as meta-distress and experiential 




experimentally. Much can be learned from the present results, including, primarily, that this 
question may be best addressed using a clinical sample, rather than psychologically healthy 
participants. Furthermore, the current study is the first to experimentally investigate the 
incremental benefits of compassionately appraising distress beyond those of viewing distress 
from a distanced perspective. Methods used in addressing these questions seemed relatively 
effective, as participants largely understood what they were being asked to do and followed 
instructions as given. As such, the current study provides an easy-to-follow template for future 
investigations in this area. Finally, the choice to assess all in-task behaviors of interest for each 
induction is a significant strength here because that data provided fascinating insights into the 
participants’ in-task behaviors that proved useful in understanding the present findings and 
making evidence-based suggestions for further work. 
Clinical Implications 
 Particularly if replicated and expanded upon, as recommended above, the present results 
might have some interesting implications for how to promote mental health and decrease 
suffering by increasing curiosity towards one’s distress, particularly within mindfulness-based 
interventions. The number and strength of clinical implications here is limited, both by the 
tenuous nature of present findings and largely by the fact that few experimental of treatment 
studies have assessed curious investigation of distress. However, a few preliminary implications 
are discernable. 
Firstly, given some evidence that MBCT may prevent depressive relapse by increasing 
recipients’ tendencies to curiously investigate their distress (Beiling et al., 2012), the present 
findings imply a way to augment the efficacy of MBCT. Specifically, practices within MBCT 




very few include an explicit focus on instilling compassion towards the self, others, or distressing 
emotions (Segal et al., 2002). By increasing the encouragement to treat one’s distress 
compassionately in MBCT meditations, it may be possible to beget yet greater curiosity in 
clients and further decrease rates of depressive relapse.  
 Changes in curious investigation over the course of MBSR have also been linked to a 
number of positive outcomes in a sample of HIV positive men who were neither presently 
depressed not abusing substances (Gayner et al., 2012). In this group, increased curious 
investigation of distress that occurred over the course of MBSR was related to decreased 
depressive symptoms, increased positive mood, decreased intrusions about stressful experiences, 
and decreased avoidance of stressful thoughts. Similar to MBCT, most practices included in 
MBSR focus on creating a distanced perspective from thoughts and emotions and an increased 
awareness of the physical sensations occurring in the present moment (Kabat-Zinn, 1990). The 
present findings suggest that MBSR might have an even greater effect on stress, sub-threshold 
depressive symptoms, and positive emotions if a greater number of practices explicitly assisted 
clients in compassionately regarding their distressing emotions. 
Finally, the present findings have some interesting implications for the effects of 
validation and self-compassion on anger and shame within DBT. There is theory and some cross-
sectional evidence that anger and angry rumination may beget the shame issues that form the 
core pathology of borderline personality disorder (Linehan, 1993; Peters, Geiger, Smart, & Baer, 
2014). In turn, issues with anger and shame may be involved in the social dysfunction that often 
accompanies a diagnosis of BPD, because it appears that individuals with BPD features may be 
especially prone to experience irritability and shame when confronted with social rejection 




investigation of distress may promote faster recovery for both anger and general negative affect 
(Ortner & Zelezao, 2012). As such, it seems plausible that DBT may help improve social 
functioning, reduce anger, and reduce shame by promoting a sense of curiosity about one’s 
distress. In turn, validation strategies in DBT, once internalized, may increase compassionate 
appraisal of distress (a component of self-compassion; Neff, 2003), which may, present evidence 
suggests, promote curiosity towards distressing emotions. Although validation and compassion 
are attitudes utilized by therapists in all DBT therapy modalities, it might still be possible, as 
with all Mindfulness-Based Treatments, to increase the focus on compassionate appraisal of 
distress in the mindfulness module in DBT. The present results loosely suggest doing so could 
provide some benefit to clients participating in DBT. 
Conclusion 
 I was unable to test many of my hypotheses related to meta-distress and experiential 
avoidance because the Judgment manipulation was ineffective in the present psychologically 
healthy sample. All available data from this and the broader literature suggest that many of the 
present study’s hypotheses related to meta-distress and experiential avoidance are better tested 
using clinical samples. Moreover, due both to potential design issues and the healthy nature of 
the current sample, between one-third and one-half of participants who were never instructed to 
view distress from a distanced perspective or compassionately appraise distress reported going so 
in this study. Once those unexpected behaviors were taken into account, the present study did 
find support for the hypotheses that either viewing distress from a distanced perspective or 
compassionately appraising distress increases curious investigation of distress.  This finding 
suggest that it might be helpful to make compassionate appraisal a specific focus in more of the 




might examine emotion-specific effects of distancing, judgmental appraisal, and compassionate 
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Table 1.   
Orthogonal Contrasts 













Distancing  (-1), 
Control (-1) 
 











 Distancing (1) Compassion (-1), 
     















 Awareness (1) Judgment (-1) 
Note: DERS-NA = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004); REQ = Experiential Avoidance subscale of the Reactions to Emotion 
Questionnaire (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a); MD-AV = Average reported in-task meta-distress;  
EA-AV = Average reported in-task experiential avoidance; TMS-C = Curiosity subscale of the 
Toronto Mindfulness Scales (Lau et al., 2006); DT-AV = Average distress tolerance; Curiosity-
AV = Average reported in-task curious exploration of distress. Measures presented in 







Total Number of Participants Who Issued Correct Responses, Made Any Type of Error, Made 
Errors of Omission, and Made Errors of Commission on the Comprehension Check for the 








(N = 40) 
Judgment 
Condition 
(N = 45) 
Distancing 
Condition 
(N = 40) 
Compassion 
Condition 
(N = 40) 
All Questions Correct 80 12 22 20 28 
 Any Error 84 28 23 20 12 
 Omission 22 4 3 1 8 
 Commission 62 24 20 19 4 
Focus on the 



























 Any Error 13 ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------- 
 Omission 13 4 3 3 3 
 Commission 0 ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------- 
Remind myself 
that I have no 
reason to feel 
distressed, it is 
a useless way 
to feel, and that 
the only reason 
I feel that way 
is because I 












































































 Any Error 19 ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------- 
 Omission 3 ------------- 3 ------------- -------------- 
 Commission 16 9 ------------ 3 4 
View my 




































 Any Error 41 ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------- 
 Omission 2 ------------- ------------ 1 1 





that I feel 
distressed for a 
reason, that I 




myself and my 
needs, and that 
allowing 
myself to feel 











































































 Any Error 48 ------------- ------------ ------------- -------------- 
 Omission 4 ------------- ----------- ------------- 4 







Table 3.  
Correlates of In-Task Behaviors/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions for the Sad Mood 
Induction Among All Participants (N = 164) 
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N = 40) 
Trait Measure     



















< .01 .08 .03 .01 
Distancing 
(EQ-Total) 
.18* -.13 .04 -.01 
 
Comprehension 
    
Number of 
Errors 
.15 -.07 -.18 .19 
Perceptions of 
Video 
    
Credibility of 
Presenter 
.28*** .27 .17 .11 
Perceived 
Utility of 





Note: *< .05, ** < .01, ***< .001; Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the Experiences 
Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Number of Errors = Number of Mistakes Made on the 
Comprehension Check; Credibility of Presenter = Participant rating from 0 (Not at all) to 8 
(Completely) of the credibility of the psycho-education and instructional videos; Perceived 
Utility of Method = Participant rating from (from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Completely) of how 
strongly they believed the presented way of responding to emotion would be useful; Awareness 
of Distress = reported time spent being aware of distress during the Sad Mood Induction; 
Judgmental Appraisal = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the Sad 
Mood Induction; Distanced Perspective = reported time spent viewing distressing emotions 
from a distanced perspective in the Sad Mood Induction; Compassionate Appraisal = reported 






Table 4.  
Correlates of In-Task Behaviors/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions for the 
Distressing Images Task Among All Participants (N = 164) 















any condition;  


























condition; N = 
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Trait Measure     



















-.01 .33* -.04 -.16 
Distancing  
(EQ-Total) 
.27*** -.14 .29* .46** 
 
Comprehension 
    
Number of 
Errors 




    
Credibility of 
Presenter 
.03 -.05 .12 -.36* 
Perceived 
Utility of 





Note: *< .05, ** < .01, ***< .001,Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Number of Errors = Number of Mistakes Made 
on the Comprehension Check; Credibility of Presenter = Participant rating from 0 (Not at all) to 
8 (Completely) of the credibility of the psycho-education and instructional videos; Perceived 
Utility of Method = Participant rating from (from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Completely) of how 
strongly they believed the presented way of responding to emotion would be useful; Awareness 
of Distress = reported time spent being aware of distress during the Distressing Images Task; 
Judgmental Appraisal = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the 
Distressing Images Task; Distanced Perspective = reported time spent viewing distressing 
emotions from a distanced perspective in the Distressing Images Task; Compassionate 
Appraisal = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the 







Table 5.  
Average Reported In-Task Behaviors/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions Among 


















M = 3.17 
SD = 2.44 
M = 4.70 
SD = 2.48 
M = 4.17 
SD = 2.58 
Judgment 
Condition 
M = 6.19 
SD = 1.58 
M = 3.92 
SD = 2.49 
M = 4.31 
SD = 2.99 
Compassion 
Condition 
M = 2.63 
SD = 3.05 
M = 5.92 
SD = 1.88 
M = 6.48 
SD = 1.31 
Sad Mood 
Induction 
(N = 98) 
Distancing 
Condition 
M = 3.27 
SD = 3.10 
M = 6.27 
SD = 1.28 
M = 4.59 




M = 1.54 
SD = 1.50 
M = 3.73 
SD = 2.26 
M = 4.19 
SD = 2.42 
Judgment 
Condition 
M = 5.61 
SD = 1.38 
M = 4.11 
SD = 2.37 
M = 4.16 
SD = 2.18 
Compassion 
Condition 
M = 1.73 
SD = 2.34 
M = 5.27 
SD = 2.47 
M = 6.53 
SD = 1.30 
Distressing 
Images Task 
(N = 111) 
Distancing 
Condition 
M = 2.74 
SD = 2.38 
M = 5.93 
SD = 1.17 
M = 4.10 
SD = 2.59 
Note:  Judgmental Appraisal = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the 
induction; Distanced Perspective = reported time spent viewing distressing emotions from a 
distanced perspective in the induction; Compassionate Appraisal = reported time spent 







Correlates of Post-Task Dependent Measures Among Induced Participants in the Sad Mood 
Induction (N = 116) 











Trait Measures    
Gender .18 -.11 -.24** 
Fear of Emotion  
(ACS-Total) 









-.06 .06 .09 
Meta-Distress 
(DERS-NonAccept) 
.17 .58*** -.02 
Distancing  
(EQ-Total) 
-.13 -.05 .14 
 
Comprehension 
   




   
Judge-SM .36*** .16 -.14 
Distancing-SM .11 .04 .24** 
Compassion-SM .13 .04 .31*** 
Post-Task Dependent 
Measures 
   
REQ-SM 1 -- --. 
 DERS-NA-SM .27** 1 -- 
TMS-C-SM -.15 .06 1 
Note: *< .05, ** < .01, ***< .001, Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Judge-SM = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions during the Sad Mood Induction; Distancing-SM = reported time spent 




Compassion-SM = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the 
Sad Mood Induction; REQ-SM = Experiential Avoidance subscale of the Responses to Emotion 
Questionnaire (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a), reworded to refer to the Sad Mood Induction; 
DERS-NA-SM = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales 
(Gratz & Roemer, 2004), reworded to refer to the Sad Mood Induction; TMS-C-SM = Curiosity 








Table 7.  
Correlates of Post-Task Dependent Measures Among Induced Participants in the Distressing 
Images Task (N = 140) 













Trait Measure     
Gender .13 -.18** -.09 < .01 
Fear of Emotion  
(ACS-Total) 














.24** .29*** .01 .06 
Distancing  
(EQ-Total) 
-.09 -.14 .29*** .15 
 
Comprehension 
    
Number of Errors .11 .19* < .01 .17* 
 
In-Task Behaviors 
    
Judge-DT .31*** .22** .04 -.02 
Distance-DT .07 < .01 .35*** -.12 




    
REQ-DT 1    
DERS-NA-DT .22** 1   
TMS-C-DT -.18* .02 1  
AV-DT -.07 -.12 -.09 1 
Note: *< .05, ** < .01, ***< .001, Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 




Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Judge-DT = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions during the Distressing Images Task; Distancing-DT = reported time spent 
viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Distressing Images Task; 
Compassion-DT = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the 
Distressing Images Task; REQ-DT = Experiential Avoidance subscale of the Responses to 
Emotion Questionnaire (Campbell-Sills et al., 2006a), reworded to refer to the Distressing 
Images Task; DERS-NA-DT = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004), reworded to refer to the Distressing Images Task; 
TMS-C-SM = Curiosity subscale of the Toronto Mindfulness Scales (Lau et al., 2006), 
reworded to refer to the Distressing Images Task; AV-DT; Average time spent viewing 







Correlates of In-Task Behavior/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions Among Inducted 
Participants in the Sad Mood Induction (N = 116) 
 In-Task Behavior/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions 










   
Gender (Men = 0, 
Woman = 1) 
.16 -.14 .09 
Fear of Emotion  
(ACS-Total) 









-.08 .15 .13 
Meta-Distress 
(DERS-NonAccept) 
.13 .04 .01 
Distancing  
(EQ-Total) 
-.09 < .01 .08 
 
Comprehension 
   
Number of Errors .09 -.20* .01 
 
 
   
Judge-SM 1 --  
Distance-SM .07 1 -- 
Compassion-SM .08 .33*** 1 
Note: * < .05** < .01 ***< .001; Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Judge-SM = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions during the Sad Mood Induction; Distancing-SM = reported time spent 
viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Sad Mood Induction; 
Compassion-SM = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the 






Table 9.  
Correlates of In-Task Behaviors/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions for Participants 
who were Induced in the Distressing Images Task (N = 140) 
 In-Task Behavior/ Compliance with Experimental Instructions 










   
Gender  .04 -.04 .08 
Fear of Emotion  
(ACS-Total) 









.02 .06 .16 
Meta-Distress 
(DERS-NonAccept) 
.21* .07 < .01 
Distancing  
(EQ-Total) 
-.16 .09 .07 
 
Comprehension 
   




   
Judge-DT 1 --  
Distance-DT .19* 1 -- 
Compassion-DT .06 .35*** 1 
Note: * < .05** < .01 ***< .001; Gender = dummy-coded gender (Male = 0, Female = 1); 
ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Judge-DT = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions during the Distressing Images Task; Distancing-DT = reported time spent 
viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Distressing Images Task; 
Compassion-DT = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the 







Correlations Between Trait Variables, Comprehension, Perceived Utility, and Perceived Credibility among Successfully-Induced 
Participants in the Sad Mood Induction (N = 116) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1, Gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) 1 -- -- -- --    
2. Fear of Emotion (ACS-Total) .15 1       
3. (Non) Judgmental Appraisal (FFMQ-
NJ) 
.04 -.55*** 1      
4. (Non) Reaction/ Experiential 
Avoidance (FFMQ-NR) 
.26** -.36*** .04 1     
5. Meta-Distress (DERS-NonAccept) .05 -.42*** -.60*** -.11 1    
6. Distancing (EQ-Total) .27** -.50*** -.33*** -.60*** -.29** 1   
7. Number of Errors in Comprehension .03 .32*** -.10 -.24* .04 -.13 1  
8. Perceived Credibility -.05 .04 -.04 -.01 .12 .06 .02 1 
9. Perceived Utility -.06 -.04 <-.01 -.10 .09 -.03 -.17t .33*** 
Note: *< .05, ** < .01,  ***< .001; ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = Non-
Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five 
Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion 
Regulation Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et 
al., 2007); Number of Errors = Number of Mistakes Made on the Comprehension Check; Credibility of Presenter = Participant rating 
from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Completely) of the credibility of the psycho-education and instructional videos; Perceived Utility of Method 
= Participant rating from (from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Completely) of how strongly they believed the presented way of responding to 







































Correlations Between Trait Variables, Comprehension, Perceived Utility, and Perceived Credibility among Successfully-
Induced Participants in the Distressing Images Task (N = 142) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1, Gender (0 = Male, 1 = 
Female) 
1 -       
2. Fear of Emotion (ACS-
Total) 
.09 1       
3. (Non) Judgmental 
Appraisal (FFMQ-NJ) 
-.02 -.60*** 1      
4. (Non) Reaction/ 
Experiential Avoidance  
(FFMQ-NR) 
-.19* -.41*** .05 1     
5. Meta-Distress (DERS-
NonAccept) 
.06 .55*** -.62*** -.21* 1    
6. Distancing (EQ-Total) .27*** .54*** .37*** .62*** .42*** 1   
7. Number of Errors in 
Comprehension 
-.03 .23* -.07 -.18** .02 -.14 1  
8. Perceived Credibility 
of Instructions 
-.03 .06 -.04 -.09 .09 -.03 -.02 1 
9. Perceived Utility of 
Instructions 
.04 < .01 -.01 -.07 .19* -.01 -.16 .43*** 
Note: *< .05, ** < .01,  ***< .001; ACS-Total = Total score of the Affective Control Scale (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-
NJ = Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction 
subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of 
the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the 
Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Number of Errors = Number of Mistakes Made on the Comprehension 
Check; Credibility of Presenter = Participant rating from 0 (Not at all) to 8 (Completely) of the credibility of the psycho-
education and instructional videos; Perceived Utility of Method = Participant rating from (from 0 (Not at all) to 8 






Path Model Predicting Post-Task Meta-Distress Among Induced Participants in the Sad Mood Induction (DERS-NA-SM) Using 





















Note: * < .05, ** < .01; All probabilities are based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals drawn from 1000 bootstrapped 
samples; Straight black lines are significant direct effects; Dashed black lines are significant indirect effects; Dashed gray lines are 
non-significant pathways; Awareness = Awareness Condition; Judgment = Judgment Condition; Distancing = Distancing Condition; 
Compassion = Compassion Condition; ACS-Total = Total Score of the Affect Control Scales (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = 
Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance 
subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); Judge-SM = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions during the Sad Mood Induction; Distancing-SM = reported time spent viewing distressing emotions from a 
distanced perspective in the Sad Mood Induction; Compassion-SM = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions 
compassionately in the Sad Mood Induction; DERS-NA-SM = post-task adaptation of the Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties 







Path Model Predicting Post-Task Experiential Avoidance Among Induced Participants in the Sad Mood Induction (REQ-SM) Using 
Experimental Conditions, Reported In-Task Behaviors, and Trait Dispositions (N = 114) 
  
Note: * < .05, ** < .01; All probabilities are based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals drawn from 1000 bootstrapped 
samples; Straight black lines are significant direct effects; Dashed black lines are significant indirect effects; Dashed gray lines are 
non-significant pathways; Awareness = Awareness Condition; Judgment = Judgment Condition; Other = All Other Conditions; 
Distancing = Distancing Condition; Compassion = Compassion Condition; ACS-Total = Total Score of the Affect Control Scales 
(Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); Judge-
SM = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the Sad Mood Induction; Distancing-SM = reported time spent 
viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Sad Mood Induction; Compassion-SM = reported time spent 
appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the Sad Mood Induction; REQ-SM = Experiential Avoidance subscale of the 






Path Model Predicting Post-Task Experiential Avoidance Among Induced Participants in the Distressing Images Task (REQ-DT) 





Note: * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001; All probabilities are based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals drawn from 1000 
bootstrapped samples; Straight black lines are significant direct effects; Dashed black lines are significant indirect effects; Dashed 
gray lines are non-significant pathways; Awareness = Awareness Condition; Judgment = Judgment Condition; Other = All Other 
Conditions; Distancing = Distancing Condition; Compassion = Compassion Condition; ACS-Total = Total Score of the Affect Control 
Scales (Williams et al., 1997); FFMQ-NJ = Non-Judgment subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 2006); 
Judge-DT = reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the Distressing Images Task; Distancing-DT = reported time 
spent viewing distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Distressing Images Task; Compassion-DT = reported time 
spent appraising distressing emotions compassionately in the Distressing Images Task; REQ-DT = Experiential Avoidance subscale of 






Path Model Predicting Post-Task Curious Investigation Among Induced Participants in the Sad Mood Induction (TMS-C-SM) Using 




Note: * < .05, ** < .01; All probabilities are based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals drawn from 1000 bootstrapped 
samples. Straight black lines are significant direct effects; Dashed black lines are significant indirect effects; Dashed gray lines are 
non-significant pathways; Awareness = Awareness Condition; Judgment = Judgment Condition; Distancing = Distancing Condition; 
Compassion = Compassion Condition; ACS-Total = Total Score of the Affect Control Scales (Williams et al., 1997); Judge-SM = 
reported time spent appraising distressing emotions during the Sad Mood Induction; Distancing-SM = reported time spent viewing 
distressing emotions from a distanced perspective in the Sad Mood Induction; Compassion-SM = reported time spent appraising 
distressing emotions compassionately in the Sad Mood Induction; TMS-C-SM = Curiosity subscale of the Toronto Mindfulness Scales 






Path Model Predicting Post-Task Curious Investigation Among Induced Participants in the Distressing Images Task (TMS-C-DT) 




















Note: * < .05, ** < .01; All probabilities are based on 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals drawn from 1000 bootstrapped 
samples; Straight black lines are significant direct effects; Dashed black lines are significant indirect effects; Dashed gray lines are 
non-significant pathways; Awareness = Awareness Condition; Judgment = Judgment Condition; Distancing = Distancing Condition; 
Compassion = Compassion Condition; DERS-NonAccept = Non-Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation 
Scales (Gratz & Roemer, 2004); FFMQ-NR = Non-Reaction subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire (Baer et al., 
2006); EQ-Total = Total of the Distancing subscale of the Experiences Questionnaire (Fresco et al., 2007); Judge-DT = reported time 
spent appraising distressing emotions during the Distressing Images Task; Distancing-DT = reported time spent viewing distressing 
emotions from a distanced perspective in the Distressing Images Task; Compassion-DT = reported time spent appraising distressing 
emotions compassionately in the Distressing Images Task; TMS-C-SM = Curiosity subscale of the Toronto Mindfulness Scales (Lau 







Psycho-Education Script and Initial Ongoing Assessments 
 “Today we are interested in examining differences in how people relate to their 
emotions. Before we get into the experiment, we just want to tell you a few things about how 
individual people may differ in the way they relate to their own emotions. Please pay attention to 
these descriptions, because we will be asking you to what extent you relate to your emotions in 
these ways during the experiment. Following this video, you will be provided with cue cards that 
will help you remember the information provided here. 
The first way that people vary is in how much distress they may feel at any one time. 
Some people tend to feel more positively/ happier, whereas others tend to feel more 
negatively/distressed.” 
VAS 
Please rate your present emotional state. 
 
______________________________________________ 
0                                                                                100 
Positive                                                                            Negative 
“The next way people vary is that some people tend to pay more attention to how they are 
feeling emotionally right now. For example, some people may check in with themselves during 
the day by asking, ‘how am I feeling in this moment?’  People who are very mindfully aware of 
their emotions often also pay closer attention to current changes in their body that might signify 
an emotional shift, like feeling tense in their shoulders and having a quicker heart rate might 
signify anxiety or anger. Other people are less aware of their emotions and do not think about 





minutes, a day, or a week ago is not being mindfully aware of emotion. Mindful awareness is 
about how you feel in this moment.” 
Over the last few minutes, I have been intentionally aware of and have been focusing 
on the emotions and sensations I was feeling in the moment and have been 
attempting to label them, either as sensations and feelings or more specifically. 








8=all the time 
“People also vary in how they view their emotions. Specifically, some people feel pushed 
around by their emotions and might even feel that they must always react to their thoughts and 
emotions. For these people, the way they feel seems to consume their whole being and their 
feelings are real forces in their bodies that direct their behaviors. For example, these people 
might say that feelings push them just as strongly as being knocked over by a truck! By contrast, 
some people look at thoughts and feelings as events that occur in the brain that neither consume 
their whole being nor dictate actions. Instead, these people believe they have the ability to 
choose if and how to respond to their feelings. Whereas a person from the first condition might 
have the thought “I am sad,” and feel that their entire being is engulfed in the sadness, people in 
the latter condition might say ‘I am feeling sad,’ or ‘I am noticing that I am feeling sad’ which 
signifies that sadness is only part of their momentary experience.  In particular, people who 
might describe themselves as noticing that they are feeling sad are thought to have a distanced 
perspective on their emotions. These people sometimes describe their relationship to their 





their mind, changing from moment to moment, rather than perceiving that their emotions are 
strong waves that consume them and then toss them about.” 
Over the last few minutes, I have been intentionally viewing my emotions from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., as if they were on a movie screen or were a wave I was riding). 








8=all the time 
 
“People also vary in how they feel about their emotions. Some people might feel 
ashamed of and angry at themselves for becoming upset. Others might feel guilty or embarrassed 
for becoming upset. Still others might feel empowered when upset or angry at others when they 
become upset.” 
Over the last few minutes, I have felt embarrassed, ashamed, guilty, or angry at myself 
for being distressed. 










  “Finally, people vary in how they react to being upset.  Some people notice they are upset 
and then take immediate steps to be rid of the feeling by distracting themselves (e.g., looking at 
something happy), blunting their negative feelings through substance use (e.g., smoking or 





will, which we call suppressing distress. These people are using a strategy called experiential 
avoidance. By contrast, other people might notice that they are upset and allow themselves to 
feel that way without taking any steps to distract themselves or dampen the intensity of the 
feeling. These people might even become curious about which emotion they are feeling (like 
sadness or anger), where they can notice physical symptoms in their body (like a headache, tense 
shoulders, or breathing fast), and why they are feeling that way (e.g., perhaps they were offended 
by something somebody said or maybe they are worried that they will not be able to repair a 
friendship with someone). These people are curiously exploring their emotions.” 
Over the last few minutes, I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions, 
think in a way to feel less distressed, focus on things that would help me feel 
less distressed, distracted myself from whatever was upsetting me, or shifted 
my attention away from things I thought might upset me. 








8=all the time 
 
Over the last few minutes, I have tried to sit with my emotions and learn from them in 
order to understand why I feel the way I feel. 















Comprehension, Credibility, and Perceived Utility Checks 
Comprehension Check 
The film you watched might or might not have suggested some specific ways of thinking about 
and viewing your emotions during the coming tasks. Please respond yes/no to the following 

























Please provide a rating of how credible you found the person in the video (for example, did you 
believe they were an expert in the subject matter covered):  

















Perceived Utility Check 
 Please provide a rating of how useful you expect to find the method presented in the video in 
coping with distress during this experiment:  
















Post-Instruction Repeated Measures 
VAS 
Please rate your present emotional state. 
 
______________________________________________ 
0                                                                                100 
Positive                                                                            Negative 
 
 
1. Over the last few minutes, I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions, 
think in a way to feel less distressed, focus on things that would help me feel 
less distressed, distracted myself from whatever was upsetting me, or shifted 
my attention away from things I thought might upset me. 








8=all the time 
 
2. Over the last few minutes, I have tried to sit with my emotions and learn from them in 
order to understand why I feel the way I feel. 


















3. Over the last few minutes, I have felt embarrassed, ashamed, guilty, or angry at myself 
for being distressed. 










4. Over the last few minutes, I have been intentionally viewing my emotions from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., as if they were on a movie screen or were a wave I was riding). 








8=all the time 
 
5. Over the last few minutes, I have been intentionally aware of and have been focusing 
on the emotions and sensations I was feeling in the moment and have been 
attempting to label them, either as sensations and feelings or more specifically. 















Measures for Sad Mood Induction 
 
Ongoing Assessments for Sad Mood Induction 
 
VAS 
Please rate your present emotional state. 
 
______________________________________________ 
0                                                                                100 
Positive                                                                            Negative 
 
1. Over the last minute, I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions, 
think in a way to feel less distressed, focus on things that would help me feel 
less distressed, distracted myself from whatever was upsetting me, or shifted 
my attention away from things I thought might upset me. 








8=all the time 
 
2. Over the last minute, I have tried to sit with my emotions and learn from them in 
order to understand why I feel the way I feel. 














3. Over the last minutes I have felt embarrassed, ashamed, guilty, or angry at myself 
for being distressed. 










4. Over the last minute, I have been intentionally viewing my emotions from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., as if they were on a movie screen or were a wave I was riding). 








8=all the time 
 
5. Over the last minute, I have been intentionally aware of and have been focusing 
on the emotions and sensations I was feeling in the moment and have been 
attempting to label them, either as sensations and feelings or more specifically. 








8=all the time 
 
Post-Task Measures for Sad Mood Induction 
 
Compliance check. During the task, I: 
Reminded myself that I had no reason to feel distressed, it is a useless way to feel, and that the 
only  
reason I feel that way is because I have not yet learned to control my feelings. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 





3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 
8 = almost all the time (80% - 100%) 
 
Reminded myself that I felt distressed for a reason, that I could use that feeling to better 
understand  
myself and my needs, and that allowing myself to feel that way might make me stronger. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 
8 = almost all the time (80% - 100%) 
 
Viewed my feelings from a distanced perspective, as if watching them on a movie screen.  
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 
8 = almost all the time (80% - 100%) 
 
Was mindfully attentive to emotions I was feeling during the task. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 








Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales- Post sad mood induction (DERS: Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004). 
 Please indicate below how often the items applied to you since you began listening to the music 
and recalling the memories, using the following scale:  
 
1 = Almost never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = About half the time 
4 = most of the time 
5 = almost always 
 
2. I paid attention to how I feel.  
6. I was attentive to my feelings.  
8. I cared about what I was feeling.  
10. When I was upset, I acknowledged my emotions  
11. When I was upset, I became angry at myself for feeling that way.  
12. When I was upset, I became embarrassed for feeling that way.  
17. When I was upset, I believed that my feelings were valid and important.  
21. When I was upset, I felt ashamed of myself for feeling that way.  
23. When I was upset, I felt like I am weak.  
25. When I was upset, I felt guilty for feeling that way.  
29. When I was upset, I became irritated at myself for feeling that way.  
34. When I was upset, I took time to figure out what I’m really feeling.  
36. When I was upset, my emotions felt overwhelming 
 
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire-Post sad mood induction (Campbell Sills et al., 
2006a). There are many different reactions that you might have had to your emotions over the 
last few minutes. Please rate the degree to which you engaged in each of the responses listed 
below using the following scale: 








8=all the time 
1. I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions. 
2. I tried to think about the music or events I recalled in a way that would make me  
feel less distressed (e.g., reminding myself it is in the past). 
3. I distracted myself from either the music or my memories. 
4. I focused on the less emotional details of the music or memory or shifted my  







Toronto Mindfulness Scale- Post sad mood induction (Lau et al., 2006). We are interested in 
what you just experienced. Below is a list of things that people  
sometimes experience. Please read each statement.  
 
Next to each statement are five choices: “not at all,” “a little,” “moderately,” “quite a  
bit” and “very much.” Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each  
statement. In other words, how well does the statement describe what you  
experienced since the music started and you began recalling the memories? 
 
Curiosity 
17: I was curious about my reactions to things.  
32: I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of how I  
react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations.  
26: I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to moment. . 
06: I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 
39: I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose.  
41: I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking notice of what 
my attention gets drawn to.  
 
Decentering 
34: I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, than in  
figuring out what they could mean.  
33: I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or 
changing them.  
37: I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without  
interfering with them.  
42: I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether it was  
pleasant or unpleasant. 
40: I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without over-identifying them.  
35: I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are.  









Measures for the Distressing Images Task 
 
Ongoing Assessments for Distressing Images Task 
 
VAS 
Please rate your present emotional state. 
 
______________________________________________ 
0                                                                                100 
Positive                                                                            Negative 
 
 
1. Over the past few slides, I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions, 
think in a way to feel less distressed, focus on things that would help me feel less 
distressed, distracted myself from whatever was upsetting me, or shifted my 
attention away from things I thought might upset me. 








8=all the time 
2. Over the past few slides, I have tried to sit with my emotions and learn from 
them in order to understand why I feel the way I feel. 








8=all the time 
3. Over the past few slides, I have felt embarrassed, ashamed, guilty, or angry at 
myself for being distressed. 













4. Over the past few slides, I have been intentionally viewing my emotions from a distanced 
perspective (i.e., as if they were on a movie screen or were a wave I was riding). 








8=all the time 
5. Over the past few slides, I have been intentionally aware of and have been 
focusing on the emotions and sensations I was feeling in the moment and have been 
attempting to label them, either as sensations and feelings or more specifically. 








8=all the time 
 
 
Post-Task Measures for Distressing Images Task 
 
Compliance check. During the task, I: 
Reminded myself that I had no reason to feel distressed, it is a useless way to feel, and that the 
only reason I feel that way is because I have not yet learned to control my feelings. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 






Reminded myself that I felt distressed for a reason, that I could use that feeling to better 
understand myself and my needs, and that allowing myself to feel that way might make me 
stronger. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 
8 = almost all the time (80% - 100%) 
 
Viewed my feelings from a distanced perspective, as if watching them on a movie screen.  
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 
8 = almost all the time (80% - 100%) 
 
Was mindfully attentive to emotions I was feeling during the task. 
0 = not at all (0 – 10%) 
1= seldom (10-20%) 
2 = occasionally (20-30%) 
3 = sometimes (30-40%) 
4 = about half the time (40-50%) 
5 = more than half the time (50-60%) 
6 = often (60-70%) 
7 = most of the time (70-80%) 








Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scales- Post distressing images (DERS: Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004). Please indicate below how often the items applied to you during or after 
viewing the distressing slides, using the following scale: 
 
1 = Almost never 
2 = Sometimes 
3 = About half the time 
4 = most of the time 
5 = almost always 
 
2. I paid attention to how I feel.  
6. I was attentive to my feelings.  
8. I cared about what I was feeling.  
10. When I was upset, I acknowledged my emotions  
11. When I was upset, I became angry at myself for feeling that way.  
12. When I was upset, I became embarrassed for feeling that way.  
17. When I was upset, I believed that my feelings were valid and important.  
21. When I was upset, I felt ashamed of myself for feeling that way.  
23. When I was upset, I felt like I am weak.  
25. When I was upset, I felt guilty for feeling that way.  
29. When I was upset, I became irritated at myself for feeling that way.  
34. When I was upset, I took time to figure out what I’m really feeling.  
36. When I was upset, my emotions felt overwhelming 
 
Reactions to Emotions Questionnaire- Post distressing images task (Campbell-Sills et al., 
2006a). There are many different reactions that you might have to your emotions while viewing 
the slides. Please rate the degree to which you engaged in each of the responses listed below 
using the following scale: 








8=all the time 
1. I tried to hold back or suppress my emotional reactions. 
2. I tried to think about the events depicted in the slides in a way that would make  
me feel less distressed (e.g., reminding myself it was fake). 
3. I distracted myself during the slides. 





my gaze when I thought I might see something upsetting. 
 
Toronto Mindfulness Scale- Post distressing images task (Lau et al., 2006). We are interested 
in what you just experienced. Below is a list of things that people  
sometimes experience. Please read each statement.  
 
Next to each statement are five choices: “not at all,” “a little,” “moderately,” “quite a  
bit” and “very much.” Please indicate the extent to which you agree with each  
statement. In other words, how well does the statement describe what you  
experienced while viewing the distressing images? 
 
Curiosity 
17: I was curious about my reactions to things.  
32: I was curious about what I might learn about myself by taking notice of how I  
react to certain thoughts, feelings or sensations.  
26: I was curious to see what my mind was up to from moment to moment. . 
06: I was curious about each of the thoughts and feelings that I was having. 
39: I remained curious about the nature of each experience as it arose.  
41: I was curious about what I might learn about myself by just taking notice of what 
my attention gets drawn to.  
 
Decentering 
34: I was more invested in just watching my experiences as they arose, than in  
figuring out what they could mean.  
33: I was more concerned with being open to my experiences than controlling or 
changing them.  
37: I was receptive to observing unpleasant thoughts and feelings without  
interfering with them.  
42: I approached each experience by trying to accept it, no matter whether it was  
pleasant or unpleasant. 
40: I was aware of my thoughts and feelings without over-identifying them.  
35: I experienced my thoughts more as events in my mind than as a necessarily 
accurate reflection of the way things ‘really’ are.  
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TO: Jennifer Shaver  
 Garrett Pollert 
 Anna Salomaa  
 Kate Sosna  
 Jennifer Veilleux 
   
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: New Protocol Approval 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-10-138 
 
Protocol Title: Appraisals of Emotion 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Approved Project Period: Start Date: 10/17/2013 Expiration Date: 10/14/2014 
 
Your protocol has been approved by the IRB. Protocols are approved for a maximum period of 
one year. If you wish to continue the project past the approved project period (see above), you 
must submit a request, using the form Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the 
expiration date. This form is available from the IRB Coordinator or on the Research Compliance 
website (http://vpred.uark.edu/210.php). As a courtesy, you will be sent a reminder two months 
in advance of that date. However, failure to receive a reminder does not negate your obligation to 
make the request in sufficient time for review and approval.  Federal regulations prohibit 
retroactive approval of continuation. Failure to receive approval to continue the project prior to 
the expiration date will result in Termination of the protocol approval. The IRB Coordinator can 
give you guidance on submission times. 
This protocol has been approved for 200 participants. If you wish to make any modifications 
in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must seek approval 
prior to implementing those changes. All modifications should be requested in writing (email is 
acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change. 
If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 
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TO: Jennifer Shaver  
 Garrett Pollert 
 Kayla Skinner  
 Anna Salomaa  
 Kate Sosna 
 Jennifer Veilleux 
 
FROM: Ro Windwalker 
 IRB Coordinator 
 
RE: PROJECT CONTINUATION 
 
IRB Protocol #: 13-10-138 
 
Protocol Title: Appraisals of Emotion 
 
Review Type:  EXEMPT  EXPEDITED  FULL IRB 
 
Previous Approval Period: Start Date:  10/17/2013 Expiration Date:  10/14/2014 
 
New Expiration Date: 10/14/2015 
 
Your request to extend the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB.  If at the end of 
this period you wish to continue the project, you must submit a request using the form 
Continuing Review for IRB Approved Projects, prior to the expiration date.  Failure to obtain 
approval for a continuation on or prior to this new expiration date will result in termination of the 
protocol and you will be required to submit a new protocol to the IRB before continuing the 
project.  Data collected past the protocol expiration date may need to be eliminated from the 
dataset should you wish to publish.  Only data collected under a currently approved protocol can 
be certified by the IRB for any purpose.  
This protocol has been approved for 200 total participants. If you wish to make any 
modifications in the approved protocol, including enrolling more than this number, you must 
seek approval prior to implementing those changes.   All modifications should be requested in 
writing (email is acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the 
change. If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 210 
Administration Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.  
